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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three independent essays on policy-making incen-
tives of government.
The first essay examineswhether citizens can indirectly control bureaucrats.
If voters and bureaucrats prefer dierent types of politicians, i.e., they have a
conflict of interest, incumbents need to increase the budget to prevent bureau-
crats from informationmanipulation, which leads to an oversized government.
If, instead, voters and bureaucrats prefer the same type of politicians, i.e., they
have an alignment of interests, bureaucrats can send to voters a credible signal
about the type of incumbents, which enhances the selection eect of election.
Although political appointees enable politicians to implement the first-best
policy in the case of the conflict of interests, they lead to the persistence of
inecient government in the case of the alignment of interests.
The second and third essays study how autocrats commit not to confis-
cate private property. The second essay argues that the potential of economic
growth would help the ruler to make a credible commitment. Since a preda-
tory policy reduces the citizens’ income, it would reduce capital accumulation
because of the income eect. Then, the ruler faces a trade-o between the cur-
rent consumptionwith the predatory policy and the larger future consumption
with the moderate policy, which would lead to economic growth.
The third essay models endogenous judicial independence (JI) as a com-
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mitment device in the political commitment game. If information on JI is
transmitted to citizens with positive probability, the ruler creates JI and does
not renege on an announcement. Even if not, the ruler still can guarantee prop-
erty rights by granting human rights as a signal on JI if the cost of the signal is
low.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
How do political system and social and economic environments aect the
government’s policy-making incentives and implemented economic policy?
This question is one of themain questions inpolitical economyand is the central
theme of this thesis. Politicians (and bureaucrats) have their own interests that
would not correspond with social welfare. Then, the implemented policy
would not agree with socially optimal policy. Hence, it is important to study
what improves the government’s policy-making incentives in terms of social
welfare. However, even though we can identify the political institution, which
gives the governmentmost appropriate incentives for social welfare, we cannot
assure that the government establish the institution. Thus, we also need to
answer the question whether the government has an incentive to establish
the socially optimal institution. The last chapter of this thesis focuses on this
question.
Chapter 2 studies how bureaucrats’ policy-making discretion aects po-
litical accountability and implemented policies. Japanese politics in the last
decade has delivered several features of bureaucracy. Firstly, political control
over bureaucracy has been one of main issues in national elections. This fact
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illustrates diculties of politically controlling bureaucracy and of reducing
ineciently high public spending caused by bureaucrats. Secondly, misman-
agement of bureaucracy led ruling incumbents to lose their oces. This fact
exemplifies a possibility that mismanagement of bureaucracy becomes a sig-
nal of incumbents’ incompetence. Thirdly, a former prime minister, Junichiro
Koizumi, successfully used political appointees so that he could improve fiscal
consolidation and promote structural reform. This fact illustrate a possibility
of political appointment being successfully controlling bureaucracy.
To study above features of bureaucracy, I develop a three-tier model of
voters, politicians and administrative bureaucrats. In the hierarchy, politi-
cians, as the agent of voters, are constrained by electoral accountability, while
bureaucrats, as the agent of politicians, are controlled by the administrative
budget. Politicians are one of two types; the competent (informed) type and
the incompetent (uninformed) type.
I analyse the model like a step-by-step process. First, as a benchmark, I
study non-hierarchical government such that politicians choose both tax and
public goods, and bureaucrats just implement policy, i.e., bureaucrats do not
have policy-making discretion. In equilibrium, the incompetent incumbent
can always mimic the competent type so that voters cannot identify the type
of the incumbent. Thus, in this benchmark, since voters always re-elect any
incumbents, political selection does not work at all.
Next, I introduce honest bureaucrats who would like to maximise public
goods provision at every period. The equilibrium dramatically diers from
that of the benchmark. Now, voters can detect the incompetent incumbent at
some state, since the incompetent incumbent mistakenly leads bureaucrats to
produce too high or too low a level of public goods compared to the first-best
level. This result shows that mismanagement of bureaucracy becomes a signal
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of incompetence of the incumbent.
Third, I introduce strategic bureaucrats who take account of the eect of
public goods provision on election outcome. The strategic bureaucrats have
an incentive to re-elect preferred and not to re-elect unpreferred incumbents.
Suppose that voters and the bureaucrats prefer dierent types of politicians, i.e.,
the bureaucrats prefer incompetent politicians to competent politicians since
the incompetent politicians will oer larger budgets to the bureaucrat future;
a case of “conflict of interests.” In equilibrium, incumbents need to increase
the budget to prevent bureaucrats from manipulating information available
to voters, which leads to an oversized government. This result explains the
first feature of Japanese bureaucracy and shows that voters have to bear the
cost of bureaucracy. If, instead, voters and bureaucrats prefer the same type
of politicians, i.e., they have an “alignment of interests,” bureaucrats can send
to voters a credible signal about the type of incumbents, which enhances the
selection eect of election.
Finally, the extended model shows that the political appointment system
can mitigate bureaucrats’ political power. In equilibrium although political
appointees enable politicians to implement the first-best policy in the case of
the conflict of interests, they lead to the persistence of inecient government
in the case of the alignment of interests.
Chapter 3 studies autocratic rulers’ policy-making incentives. The central
question is why some autocrats have adopted a successful policy for economic
growth, while others have applied a predatory policy. The political science
literature stresses the lack of state capacity in African countries as a reason for
underdevelopment. In this view, the African states do not have a sucient
capacity to collect taxes, which is a problem of the weak state. East Asian
states, in contrast, have successfully adopted market-friendly policies, such
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as property rights protection and sound macroeconomic policies, and have
intervened in the market to direct investment to specific industrial sectors and
avoid coordination failure.
Chapter 3 focuses on a ruler’s commitment problem as the key to economic
development. While the literature proposes the reputation equilibrium as a
solution to the problem, I use the Markov perfect equilibrium and argue that
the potential of economic growth and possibility of the revolution helps the
ruler to make a credible commitment. Since a predatory policy reduces the
citizens’ income, it reduces capital accumulation because of the income eect.
Then, the ruler faces a trade-o between the current consumption with the
predatory policy, and the larger future consumption with the moderate policy,
which leads to economic growth.
I show that if the potential for economic growth is high, the ruler ratio-
nally refrains from confiscation today to promote economic growth, and then
expropriates the grown resources in the future. One interpretation of this is
that an East Asian ruler who expected large economic growth based on high
education attainment could restrain from confiscation and commit to market-
friendly policies for attaining economic growth. High educational attainment
would increase economic growth, not only through high productivity, but also
by constraining the ruler’s predatory actions.
An extended model studies two eects of revolution on the ruler’s policy-
making incentives. First, revolution leads to high political accountability, since
the ruler engaged in expropriation can be likely replaced during a revolution,
and so the ruler hesitates to impose a high tax. In a state with high fraction-
alisation, e.g., sub-Saharan African countries, the cost of revolution, such as
the cost of the successful coordination and management of an organization,
would be high. Thus, those countries have an impediment to commitment and
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economic development. Second, if the probability of replacement is high for
any situation, political instability becomes a problem for commitment. With
a high probability of replacement, a ruler chooses present consumption over
future consumption.
Furthermore, the model shows potential multiple equilibria due to coordi-
nation failure among the private sectors. With the case of multiple equilibria,
the ruler needs the cooperation of the citizens to attain the Pareto-superior equi-
librium. The deliberation councils created by the governments in some Asian
countries made coordination possible and led to high-economic growth equi-
librium. High fractionalisation in African countries, however, would cause
coordination failure.
Chapter 4 studies why some rulers establish and support political institu-
tions, such as independent judiciaries, which constrain rulers’ behaviour. It
also studies why some rulers protect property rights and human rights, even
if it is costly. Figuring out a ruler’s incentive to establish institutions and to
protect various rights is a key to shedding light on the mechanism of economic
development.
An important role of judicial independence (JI) is a commitment device.
Research in economic history shows that, in 17th-century England, the gov-
ernment under the Stuarts’ reign could not borrow enough money due to their
inability to honor contractual agreements. After the Glorious Revolution of
1688, an advanced role of Parliament and the independent judiciary enabled
the government to keep their credible commitments. After the Cold War, a
number of competitive authoritarian governments came into the world. For
the purpose of the states’ survival, the Asian authoritarian regimes established
high-quality courts. The judiciaries in these countries promote foreign invest-
ment and enhance financial credibility in the regimes, which are crucial for
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such small states to survive.
An independent judiciary is necessary for credibility, but is not sucient.
A government strong enough to create institutions is also strong enough to
abolish the institutions to renege on a promise of property rights protection.
Thus, the government must commit to keep the judiciary independent.
Chapter 4models JI as a commitment device in a political commitment game
between a ruler and citizens. In the game, the ruler creates the endogenous
level of JI and announces the tax rate. After citizens produce output, the ruler
has the opportunity to renege on the announced tax rate. If the ruler tries to
renege, he must pay the reneging cost, which is positively proportional to the
level of JI
I show that if citizens can observe an established level of JI with some
positive probability, the ruler creates an independent judiciary and credibly
commits to an announced tax rate. Thus, in equilibrium, the ruler can credibly
protects private property rights. The equilibrium tax rate, however, ine-
ciently high in the sense that the tax rate is on the inecient side of the Laer
curve. The ineciently high tax reflects the cost of credible commitment.
In the extended model, I analytically argue the positive role of human
rights under the commitment problem. Even though citizens never observe
the degree of JI, the ruler still can guarantee property rights by granting human
rights as a signal of JI if the cost of the signal is low. In this equilibrium, however,
in addition to the ineciently high tax rate, another source of ineciency arises.
Equilibrium JI is ineciently high in the sense that JI is not fully used for
credible commitment to the lower tax rate. The ineciently high JI represents
the cost of credible signaling.
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Chapter 2
The Political Power of Bureaucracy
2.1 Introduction
Japanese politics in the last decade has delivered several features of bureau-
cracy. First, political control over bureaucracy has been one of main issues in
national elections. For instance, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the
Lower House election in 2009 with a campaign promise of “from government
delegated to bureaucracy to politician-led government.” Suering from huge
deficits, politicians have attempted to curtail wasteful public spending that
has been caused by bureaucrats.1 Despite administrative reforms, politicians,
however, have not succeed in politically controlling bureaucracy. The example
shows diculties of politically controlling bureaucracy and of reducing ine-
ciently high public spending. Second, mismanagement of bureaucracy could
lead ruling incumbents to political defeat. The DPJ lost the Lower House elec-
tion in 2012, one of the reasons of which was that the DPJ failed in resolving
a political conflict with bureaucrats and establishing political leadership. Citi-
zens found the DPJ’s incompetence about policy making. The example shows
1Niskanen (1971) examines bureaucracy as the primary cause of increases in the size of
government.
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a possibility that mismanagement of bureaucracy becomes a signal of incum-
bents’ incompetence. Third, a former prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, used
theCouncil onEconomic andFiscal Policy (CEFP), fourmembers ofwhichwere
politically appointees from the business sector and from academia. The CEFP
made a basic design of an annual budget and helped improving fiscal consoli-
dation and promoting structural reform. In addition to the CEFPmembers, Mr.
Koizumi appointed the increased numbers of junior ministers, state secretaries
and parliamentary secretaries, which curbed the influence of bureaucrats on
policy making. The example shows a possibility of political appointment be-
ing successfully controlling bureaucracy. Although these features are special
to Japanese politics, the countries that suers from bureaucracy seem to have
similar features.
By using a three-tier model in which the top principals are voters, the su-
pervisors are politicians and the agents are administrative bureaucrats, this
chapter studies how bureaucracy aects political accountability and imple-
mented policies. The above several features of bureaucracy will be explained.
In the governance relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, this
chapter focuses on budgetary control as a device of political discipline, and
uses a simple model of public finance such that government taxes citizens to
produce public goods. While politicians have real authority to choose taxes so
as to control the administrative budget, bureaucrats possess policymaking dis-
cretion over producing public goods because of complexity of public services
and imperfect monitoring by politicians.2 Then, I will discus the possibility of
oversized government due to imperfect control over bureaucracy.
In the accountability relationship between constituents and politicians, this
2Politicians would incur excessive costs to write the complete contract about implementa-
tion of policies to bureaucrats.
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chapter builds on a simple two-period political agency model with two types
of politicians; the informed typewho observes the cost of public goods, and the
uninformed type who does not. Voters never observe the type of incumbents.
The main issue is a political selection. Since the informed type can implement
the ecient policy in the last period, voters would like to re-elect only the
informed type. I will study the selection eect of the election, which is defined
as the probability that voters can dismiss their unpreferred type of politicians.
Bureaucrats’ policymaking discretion and voters’ unobservability of the
type of incumbents gives bureaucrats political power. Since voters evaluate
incumbents based on public goods produced by bureaucrats as well as taxes
imposed by incumbents, bureaucrats may manipulate the information avail-
able to voters about incumbents by reducing production of public goods, i.e.,
sabotage. Then, bureaucrats may try to re-elect their preferred incumbent and
to not re-elect their unpreferred.3
A main result of the three-tier model is that bureaucrats’ political power
could cause an ineciently oversized government when bureaucrats and vot-
ers have a “conflict of interests” about the type of politicians; i.e., bureaucrat
prefer the uninformed politician while voters prefer the informed politician.
Since bureaucrats have an incentive to not re-elect their unpreferred politician,
they could try to disguise her as the uninformed type by reducing public goods.
The politician needs to increase an administrative budget to prevent bureau-
crats frommanipulating information since the large budget makes information
manipulation costly to bureaucrats.
Another major finding concerns the selection mechanism of elections. In
the two-tier model of voters and politicians, the political selection does not
3One example is 37th President in theU.S., RichardNixon, whowasworried about sabotage
by federal bureaucrats who would be opposed to his conservative policies (Wilson, 1989).
17
work at all since the uninformed politician can mimic the informed type with-
out any cost. Then, all equilibria are pooling equilibria, in which both types
of politicians are always re-elected. However, in the three-tier model with
bureaucrats’ discretion, since public goods produced by bureaucrats convey
information about incumbents to voters, the uninformed politicians cannot al-
waysmimic the informed type. Then, voters benefits from the selection eect of
semi-separating equilibrium. Furthermore, when both voters and bureaucrats
prefer the informed politician, referred to as an “alignment of interests,” the
bureaucrats’ political power enhances the selection eect. For example, sup-
pose that the incumbent is the uninformed type. If bureaucrats produce public
goods slightly less than they produce when the incumbent is the informed
type, voters can perfectly identify the type of incumbents. Thus, bureaucrats
can send a credible signal to voters at a small cost to remove their unpreferred
incumbent from oce.
This chapter also explores the costs and benefits of the political appointment
system. Extended models show that political appointees can prevent bureau-
crats from exercising the political power to dismiss the incumbents. In the case
of conflict of interests, informed politicians can implement the first-best policy
when they can observe the type of bureaucrats with perfect accuracy, or when
appointees have a valuable outside option when the appointing incumbent is
not re-elected. In the case of alignment of interests, the political appointment
system, however, leads to persistence of the inecient government since the
selection eect of the election becomes limited.
This chapter concerns several areas of research. Research on bureaucracies
has been developed since the seminal work of Niskanen (1971). Moe (in press)
provides an excellent survey on legislative control and delegation. Brehm
and Gates (1997) discuss the phenomenon of bureaucratic sabotage preventing
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political authorities from implementing their preferred policies. Tirole (1994)
and Dixit (2002) study the design of incentives of bureaucrats who engage in
the multiple tasks and pursue multiple missions.
This chapter also relates to the research on political accountability initiated
by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). Persson and Tabellini (2002) and Besley
(2006) apply the political accountability model to the public finance problem
and discuss the size of government. Alesina and Tabellini (2007) study the
allocation of policy tasks between politicians motivated by re-election and
bureaucrats motivated by career concern.
Bureaucrats’ political power is discussed by Moe (2006) and Greif (2008)
without any theoretical models.4 Moe (2006) conjectures that politicians wor-
rying about bureaucrats’ political powermay relax the control of bureaucracies
and choose policies more preferable to bureaucrats. This chapter confirms his
conjecture at the case of conflict of interests. The survey by Moe (in press)
points out that, although analysis of bureaucrats’ political power is important,
it is completely missing from the literature.
The three-tier hierarchical model (principal-supervisor-agent) is originally
created by Tirole (1986).5 Onemain dierence between this chapter and Tirole’s
is as follows. In hismodel, the topprincipal is a constitutional designerwho can
oer complete contracts withmonetary transfers both to the supervisor and the
agent. In mymodel, the top principal is a voter who can only select a politician
in an election, which implies that abilities of the top principal are quite limited.6
4Political power defined by Moe (2006) is the extent to which bureaucrats take part in the
election directly and choose their supervisors. Greif (2008) discusses political power from
a historical perspectives and argues that constitutionalism evolved to facilitate cooperation
among the powerful.
5Laont (2000) applies this model to the theory of regulation and studies the normative
analysis of constitutional design.
6Another dierence is the possibility of a side contract between the supervisor and the
agent. Although I ignore the possibility of outright collusion, the bureaucrat’s political power
may generate implicit collusion. Bureaucratsmay reduce public goods to hide information and
19
Finally, although they do not discuss the political power of bureaucracies, two
recent papers, Drometer (in press) and Vlaicu and Whalley (2011), study the
three-tier hierarchical model with voters as the top principal. They show that
a hierarchy has potential advantages for voters since policymakers implement
less distorted policies.
The chapter is organised like a step-by-step process. Section 2.2 studies
non-hierarchical government. Section 2.3 introduces honest bureaucrats who
do not have political power. Section 2.4 introduces strategic bureaucrats who
have political power. Section 2.5 analyses political appointments. Section 2.6
provides the conclusion. Proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2.2 Non-Hierarchical Government
This section studies the simplest non-hierarchical model with a two-period
horizon, indexed by t = 1; 2. The economy is populated by two types of
players: identical voters (referred to as “they”) and a politician (referred to as
“she”). The role of a bureaucrat (referred to as “he”) is just to implement the
policy which an incumbent orders.
Voters have a per-period quasi-linear utility function over public goods, g,
and tax, , shown by u(g)   .7 Function u satisfies ug > 0, ugg < 0, uggg  0,
limg!0 ug = +1 and limg!1 ug = 0. A set of public goods, g, and tax, , is
referred to as a policy.
The cost of producing public goods, g, is g, where  is a stochastic state
taking two values, , with probability p > 1=2, and , with probability 1   p,
to re-elect their preferred politicians, which can be interpreted as implicit collusion between
supervisors and agents.
7Voters would discount their future utility at some positive rate. Since the discount factor
of voters does not aect any of the decisions of any of the players, it is omitted from analysis.
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where  >  > 0. The assumption of p > 1=2 is just for simplification.8 At each
period, the cost is independently realised. Voters never observe the realised
value of . The amount of provided public goods needs to satisfy government
budget constraints for each period, so that  g  0. Let gˆ(;) be themaximal
amount of public goods the government can produce given tax, , and cost, ,
i.e., gˆ(;) = =.
Politicians are one of two types, it 2 fI;Ug. While type I politicians, repre-
senting “informed” politicians, can observe state  when it is realised, type U
politicians, representing “uninformed” politicians, observes it after taxation is
collected. The prior probability of the incumbent being type I is . At the end
of the first period, incumbent i1 and a challenger contest the election. Before the
election, nature chooses the challenger based on prior probability . Politicians
know their own type, but voters cannot observe it.
Voters vote after observing implemented policy (g1; 1). Let  denote the
indicator function, which is equal to 1 when voters re-elect the incumbent and
to 0 when they elect the challenger. For simplicity, when voters are indierent
about both the incumbent and the challenger, voters re-elect the incumbent.9
Politicians have a lexicographic preference. As a first objective, the incum-
bent maximises the probability of winning an election. If there exist several
policies that maximise the probability of winning, as a second objective, the
incumbent chooses the policy thatmaximises voters’ utility.10 Since the election
does not take place at the second period, the second-period incumbent chooses
8When p < 1=2, only the equilibrium strategy of the type U incumbent are changed.
9In the mixed-strategy equilibrium such that voters use mix strategies when they are indif-
ferent between the incumbent and the challenger, type U also uses mixed strategy.
10The lexicographic preference implies that both types of politicians enjoy some exogenous
ego rents fromholding the oce. Furthermore, the value of the rents is considerably outweighs
the payo derived from the implemented policy. Characteristics of equilibrium does not
change, even if politicians’ payo is positively additive of political rents and policy payos
when political rents are suciently large.
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the policy that maximises voters’ utility.
The timing of events within each period is as follows. Given the incumbent
politician it:
1. The cost of public goods, t, is realised, and the incumbent observes it
only if she is type I.
2. The incumbent politician sets tax, t, and taxation is collected.
3. The incumbent observes the cost if she is type U and produces public
goods, gt.
The election takes place only at the end of the first period.
2.2.1 First-best policies
This section shows the first-best policy, (g f b();  f b()), whichmaximises voters’
utility given cost . Since government budget constraint should bind under
the first-best policy, the first-best tax is
 f b() = argmax

u(gˆ(;))   ; (2.1)
and thefirst-best public goods is g f b() = gˆ( f b();). Although g f b() is greater
than g f b(), the relationship between  f b() and  f b() is undetermined under
general functional form u.
To make the analysis interesting, assume that function u satisfies the fol-
lowing condition:
 f b() ,  f b(): (A1)
Assumption (A1) implies that an information disadvantage does not enable
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type U always to impose the first-best tax because she cannot set the tax de-
pendent on cost .11
2.2.2 Equilibrium
The game is solved with the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
Let a set of strategies ffNit ; gNit gi2fI;Ug;t2f1;2g; Ng be the profile of PBE strategies. As
shown later, there exists a continuum of PBE. To focus on unique reasonable
equilibrium, I define political equilibrium (PE) which the type I politician
prefers most among all PBE.12
PEmakes sense for two reasons. The first reason is based on the timing and
information structure of the game. After realisation of the type of incumbents
and the cost of public goods, thenextplayer tomakeadecision is the incumbent.
Because of the information disadvantage, type U would like to mimic type
I. Thus, type I would have the initiative. The second reason is that the
incumbent’s second objective is to maximise voters’ welfare. Given the result
that type I is always re-elected in any PBE, voters should follow the equilibrium
policies that type I prefers most.
Before characterising the equilibriumpolicy, I define three types of potential
equilibria on the basis of thefirst-period tax. Note thatwhile the strategyof type
I depends on the cost of public goods, the strategy of type U is independent
from it. The separating equilibrium is such that type I and type U choose
dierent taxes for any cost, i.e., NI1(1) , 
N
U1 for any 1. Next, the semi-
separating equilibrium is such that type I chooses the dierent taxes dependent
on the cost, and type U chooses the same tax as type I at some state, i.e.,
11If condition (A1) does not hold, both types of politicians choose the first-best policy and
can always get re-elected.
12Although this game can apply the intuitive criterion for choice of public goods, it cannot
reduce the number of equilibria.
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NI1(1) , 
N
I1(
0
1) = 
N
U1 for any 1 , 
0
1. Finally, the pooling equilibrium is
defined such that both politicians choose the same taxes for any cost, i.e.,
NI1(1) = 
N
U1 for any 1. The later sections will also use this classification.
Strategies at the second period
Both types of politicians maximise voters’ welfare at the second period. First,
both types produce the maximum amount of public goods given tax 2 and
cost 2,13
gNI2(2;2) = g
N
U2(2;2) = gˆ(2;2): (2.2)
Second, type I implements the first-best tax; NI2(2) = 
f b(2). Since type U
does not know the cost of public goods, shemaximises voters’ expectedwelfare
at the information set.
NU2 = 
e  argmax

pu(gˆ(;)) + (1   p)u(gˆ(;))   : (2.3)
Strategies at the first period
First, consider voters’ strategy. Since only the type I politician will implement
the first-best policy at the second period, voters would like to re-elect only her.
Let ˜(g1; 1) denote the posterior belief that the first-period incumbent is type
I given implemented policy (g1; 1). Then, the voting strategy is
N(g1; 1) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1
0
9>>>>=>>>>; if ˜(g1; 1)
8>>>><>>>>:

<
9>>>>=>>>>;: (2.4)
13Note that the equilibrium strategy at the second period does not depend on the history of
the game of the first period. The result would also hold in the model of later sections.
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From the assumption of the tie-break rule, voters re-elect the incumbent when
the updated belief is equal to the prior belief.
Next, consider the equilibrium policies. Politician i1 chooses public goods
such that gNi11(1;1) 2 argmaxggˆ(1;1) N(g; 1) given 1 and 1. Notice that
since both types of politicianshave samepreference andobserve the cost of pub-
lic goodswhen choosing public goods, it is satisfied that gNI1(1;1) = g
N
U1(1;1).
Type I sets the tax such that NI1(1) 2 argmax N(gNI1(;1); ) while typeU sets
the tax such that NU1 2 argmaxfpN(gNU1(;); )+ (1  p)N(gNU1(;); )g. Since
the incumbent can get re-elected if she is identified as type I, type U tries to
mimic type I. The following proposition shows that all equilibria are pooling
equilibria, in which type U can always mimic type I and get re-elected.
Proposition 2.1. Consider the game of a non-hierarchical government. All of PBE
are a pooling equilibrium, which supports any level of first-period taxes. Both types
of politicians choose the same amount of public goods, and PBE supports any size of
public goods implementable given the tax and the cost. On the equilibrium path, both
types are re-elected at any state.
Intuition of the proof that there exists no semi-separating equilibrium is as
follows. Even if type I chooses dierent taxes based on the cost, type U can
mimic type I by choosing the tax that type I chooses at cost . Then, type U
can always implement policy (gNI1(
N
I1();); 
N
I1()) even at cost . However,
this strategy is not equilibrium. Since the updated belief of voters observing
(gNI1(
N
I1();); 
N
I1()) is p=(p+1 ) < , voters do not re-elect the incumbent.
Thus, the above strategy of type U is not best response, and any strategy of
typeU for semi-separating equilibrium is not consistentwith Bayesian updated
beliefs.
Without hierarchy in government, the selectionmechanism of election does
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not work. Under the pooling PBE, voters cannot fire the type U politician.
The result is compatible with literature that points out that the incentive to
establish a good reputation leads to the inecient equilibrium (Morris, 2001).
The politician’s lexicographic preference implies that she infinitely weights her
reputation in comparison to the policy preference.
There exists a continuum of PBE supported by voters’ pessimistic beliefs.
Since the incumbent’s main concern is re-election, if the probability of re-
election is maximised only at the extreme tax, the incumbent chooses that tax
at the sacrifice of voters’ utility.
Finally, I characterise PE. Since PBE supports any level of taxes which are
independent from the cost of public goods, thefirst-periodPE tax is tomaximise
the voters’ “expected” welfare. The PE size of public goods is the maximum
able to be produced.
Proposition 2.2. Consider the game of a non-hierarchical government. In PE, both
types implement same tax e, and same public goods gˆ(e;1).
Since the type I incumbent knows the current cost, shewould like to deviate
from the PE tax, e, to the first-best tax,  f b(1), if voters identify her as type
I. Even if the first-best policy is implemented, voters cannot believe that the
incumbent is type I. Thus, type I does not choose the first-best tax.
2.3 Hierarchical Government without Bureaucrats’
Political Power
This section explicitly introduces the third player, a bureaucrat, to study the
simple model of hierarchical government. Although the incumbent politician
has the right to decide the size of the budget, she needs the bureaucrat to
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produce public goods. Because of the complexity of public services and the
imperfect monitoring by politicians, the bureaucrat has discretionary power
to choose the size of public goods. In sum, the incumbent sets tax, and the
bureaucrat sets public goods at each period.
The bureaucrat in this section is called an honest type, denoted by H, and
does not take the result of the election into account. The type H bureaucrat’s
utility is the size of public goods gt and then his objective is simply tomaximise
public goods provision given the budget. Type H is assumed to discount the
future payo completely. The assumption implies that the bureaucrat does not
evaluate the eect of public goods on the result of the election when choosing
public goods. The next section introduces another type of bureaucrats who has
a positive discount factor.
The bureaucrat observes the cost of public goods when the cost is realised.
The third event of the timing of the game is changed as follows:
3. Given the budget, t, the bureaucrat produces and provides public goods,
gt.
The modified timing of the event implies that the incumbent would control the
bureaucrat through the budget size.
2.3.1 Equilibrium
As in the previous section, there exists a continuum of PBE for this game. Thus,
again after characterising PBE, I will discuss about PE. Let a set of strategies
ffHit gi2fI;Ug;t2f1;2g; fgHHtgt2f1;2g; Hg denote a profile of the PBE strategies.
Notice that, given t and t, the strategy of the type H bureaucrat is
gHHt(t;t) = gˆ(t;t) for any t 2 f1; 2g.
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Equilibrium second-period taxes are the same as those in the last section,
that is, (2.3), since the equilibrium strategy of public goods at the second period
is the same.
At the time of the election, as in the previous section, voters would like to
elect only the informed politician. Although the incumbent sets only the tax in
the first period, voters use public goods produced by the bureaucrat as well as
the tax, so as to identify the type of the incumbent. Thus, the voting strategy is
also the same as (2.4).
Politicians take into account not only the direct eect of the tax onhis reputa-
tion but also the indirect eect through public goods provided by bureaucrats.
Type I chooses the tax such as HI1(1) 2 argmax H(gˆ(;1); ), while type U
chooses HU1 = argmax p
H(gˆ(;); )+ (1  p)H(gˆ(;); ). Again, typeU tries
to mimic type I so as to increase her re-election probability.
For the typeU politician, loss of the right to choose public goodsmeans loss
of the ability to manipulate information. Now, Type U may fail to mimic type
I. Suppose that type I chooses dierent taxes in dierent states, i.e., HI1() ,
HI1(), and also suppose that type U sets 
H
U1 = 
H
U1(). Type U can imitate
type I only when  = . Then, both types of politicians implement policy
(gˆ(HI1();); 
H
I1()). However, voters can identify the type of the incumbent at
 because the bureaucrat working with type U sets gˆ(HI1();) at  rather than
gˆ(HI1();).
Semi-separating PBEnowbecomes attainable. In semi-separating PBE, type
U sets tax that is more likely to be imposed by type I, so as to mimic type I
with a higher probability. An assumption of p > 1=2 implies type I more
frequently sets HI1() than 
H
I1(). Hence, type U optimally chooses 
H
I1(). At
the less frequent event, , voters can identify the type of incumbent. Notice that
although the politician who sets HI1() is only type I, voters should have o-
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equilibrium belief that ˜H(gˆ(HI1();); 
H
I1()) < . If otherwise, type U prefers
to choose HI1() rather than 
H
I1(), which is not consistent to voters’ belief.
The following proposition summarises the above discussion.14
Proposition 2.3. Consider the game without the bureaucrat’s political power. Semi-
separating PBE support any level of taxes type I chooses at first period. The tax type
U chooses is HU1 = 
H
I1(). On the equilibrium path, while type I is always re-elected
at any state, type U is re-elected only at .
Proposition 2.3 shows thepositive role of bureaucracy on the electoralmech-
anism. The last section shows that if the politician can choose both tax and pub-
lic goods, voters cannot fire the typeU politician. The hierarchical government
under which the politician and the bureaucrat have dierent levels of decision-
making authority achieves the selection eect. Intuitively, the hierarchical
government can transmit information to voters more than the non-hierarchical
government, which helps to avoid the pooling equilibria.
Politicians’ mismanagement of bureaucracy becomes a signal of the incum-
bent being incompetent. In Japan, voters at the Lower House election in 2012
did not support theDPJ,which conflictedwith bureaucrats and failed to control
them.
Next, I discuss PE in this game. Since the first-best policy is implementable
by type I in the semi-separating PBE, it is the PE.
Proposition 2.4. Consider the game without the bureaucrat’s political power. PE is a
semi-separating PBE in which the tax type I chooses at the first period is the first-best
tax, and the tax type U chooses is  f b().
Compared with the PE in the non-hierarchy model represented in Propo-
sition 2.2, voters derive two advantages and incur one disadvantage from the
14There also exist pooling PBE which support any level of first-period taxes.
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hierarchical government. The first advantage is from the semi-separating equi-
librium since it gives voters a chance to fire the typeU incumbents. The second
advantage is that type I can implement the first-best policy. The disadvantage
is that, since type U tries to mimic type I, she mistakenly implements an un-
preferred policy, (gˆ( f bI1 ();); 
f b
I1 ()), with probability 1  p. Although the total
eect is ambiguous, the disadvantage is negligible under high p and/or high 
since the probability of type U’s mistake is small.15
2.4 Hierarchical Government with Bureaucrats’
Political Power
This section introduces another type of bureaucrats, called the strategic bureau-
crat and denoted by S. Let jt 2 fH;Sg denote the type of bureaucrats at period
t. The probability of the type of bureaucrats being type H is , and only the
bureaucrat knows his own type. Furthermore, while the bureaucrat knows the
type of the incumbent, he does not know the type of challenger in the election.
The strategic type takes account of the future payos as well as the current
payos. His total payo is g1+ Sg2, where S 2 (0; 1) is his discount factor. For
future concerns, the strategic type may try to aect the result of the election by
manipulating information available to voters.
At the beginning of the first period, nature chooses the type of the bureau-
crat, who then chooses the first-period and second-period public goods, i.e.,
j1 = j2. Section 2.5 modifies the assumption of j1 = j2 to study the political
appointment system.
Furthermore, for existence of the equilibrium, I assume that public goods,
15There exists a semi-separating PBE in the hierarchical model in which “voters’ utility” is
higher than that in any PBE in the non-hierarchical model.
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g, take discrete values. The dierence between the n-th and n 1-th large public
goods is infinitesimally small . Thus, public goods can still be regarded as the
continuous variable except in the equilibrium analysis of the case of alignment
of interests in Section 2.4.3.
2.4.1 Equilibrium
This section focuses on the PBE that satisfies the intuitive criterion for voters’
o-equilibrium beliefs about the type of the incumbent. After the incumbent
chooses tax, the game is a type of signaling games in which the sender is the
bureaucrat and receivers are voters. Voters use public goods provided by the
bureaucrat to identify the type of the incumbent while the type S bureaucrat
strategically sends information to voters. A formal definition of the intuitive
criterion is shown in Appendix 2.8.16 Furthermore, voters’ o-equilibrium
beliefs about the type of bureaucrats are restricted as follows: Voters believe the
bureaucrat to be type S, if o-equilibrium public goods are implemented after
o-equilibrium tax is imposed. The o-equilibrium beliefs are reasonable since
only the type S bureaucrat may have an incentive to change public goods from
gˆ(1; 1).17 The intuitive criterion reduces the number of PBE only at a case of
alignment of interests, as discussed later. Let ffSitgi2fI;Ug;t2f1;2g; fgSjtg j2fH;Sg;t2f1;2g; Sg
denote a profile of the PBE strategies of this game, which satisfies the intuitive
criterion.
16Although the tax chosen by the incumbent is a signal showing her type, the usual forward-
induction refinements (i.e., intuitive criterion and divinity) for choice of the tax cannot be
defined.
17Suppose that the incumbent implement an o-equilibrium tax. Then, the o-equilibrium
beliefs are compatible to any types of forward-induction restriction since, for the type H
bureaucrat, any public goods in [0; gˆ(1; 1)) is equilibrium dominated.
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Strategies at the second period
Both types of bureaucrats at the second period maximise the size of public
goods within a budget. Thus, the strategy of bureaucrats does not change from
the previous sections, i.e., (2.2). Furthermore, the equilibrium tax at the second
period is also the same as in the previous sections, i.e., (2.3).
The bureaucrat prefers the higher tax given the realised cost since he can
producemore public goods. Given the equilibriumpolicy at the second period,
let G2(i2) denote the continuation value for the bureaucrat:
G2(i2) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
pgˆ( f b();) + (1   p)gˆ( f b();) if i2 = I;
pgˆ(e;) + (1   p)gˆ(e;) if i2 = U:
(2.5)
Furthermore, let G˜2 = G2(I)+ (1  )G2(U), which is interpreted as the contin-
uation value for the bureaucrat when the challenger wins election.
I formally define conflict of interests and alignment of interests, the terms
discussed in the introduction. Since voters prefer the type I politician to the
type U, conflict of interests is defined as G2(I) < G2(U). On the contrary,
alignment of interests is defined as G2(I) > G2(U). The next lemma makes the
following analysis simple.
Lemma 2.1. It holds that G2(U) > G2(I) when  f b() >  f b(), and G2(U) < G2(I)
when  f b() <  f b().
Note that the negative second derivative of utility u() implies that vot-
ers have motive for consumption-smoothing across state  while the bureau-
crat is neutral in terms of smoothing. Since voters with strong motive for
consumption-smoothing prefer higher tax at the high cost state, it holds that
 f b() >  f b(). Thus, the first-best tax type I chooses is aimed formore smooth-
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ing than the taxes typeU chooses, which indicates that bureaucrats prefers type
U to type I.
Strategies at the first period
First, voters still follow the samevoting strategy as (2.4) in theprevious sections.
Second, since the type H bureaucrat simply maximises public goods, his
strategy is also the same as in the last section, gSH1(1;1) = gˆ(1;1).
The type S bureaucrat takes the eect of public goods on the voting strategy
into account. Then, the strategy depends on the type of incumbents, as follows:
gSS1(1;1; i1) = arg maxg:  g0
g + S
n
S(g; 1)G2(i1) + [1   S(g; 1)]G˜2
o
: (2.6)
To explain type S’s strategy, consider the following example of conflict of
interests. Suppose that the incumbent at the first period is type I. Now, the
type S bureaucrat has an incentive to fire the incumbent. Given the tax the
incumbent chose, if the voting strategy satisfies S(gˆ(1;1); 1) = 0, type S
optimally chooses gˆ(1;1). Choice of gˆ(1;1) attains both themaximisation of
public goods provision and the dismissal of the incumbent. Suppose, instead,
that S(gˆ(1;1); 1) = 1. Then, type S faces a trade-o between maximising
public goods and firing the incumbent. If the current payo is attractive to
type S, he chooses gˆ(1;1) although the incumbent would be re-elected. If
otherwise, he chooses the largest public goods in [0; gˆ(1;1)], which satisfies
S(g; 1) = 0.
The strategies of politicians are defined as follows. The type I politician
sets the tax such that SI1(1) 2 argmax S(gˆ(;1); )+ (1 )S(gSS1(;1; I); ).
TypeU chooses SU1 2 argmaxEfS(gˆ(;); )+(1 )S(gSS1(;;U); )g, where
the expectation operator is over 1. Since the incumbent does not observe
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the type of the bureaucrat, she maximises the expected payos over types of
bureaucrats.
PBE has quite dierent characters between Case (I) conflict of interests
and Case (II) alignment of interests, since type S has distinct incentives at the
election between them. Thus, I classify the following discussion into two cases.
2.4.2 Case (I): Conflict of Interests
This section considers a case of conflict of interests by assuming that  f b() >
 f b(). The assumption means that the type S bureaucrat has incentives to
re-elect the type U incumbent and to fire type I in the election.
At first, to simplify the following analyses, I define the incentive compati-
bility of type S’s strategy.
Definition 2.1. The PBE strategy of the type S bureaucrat is incentive compatible if
gS1(1;1; i1) = gˆ(1;1) on the equilibrium path.
If the type S bureaucrat chooses the incentive comparable strategy, he does
not dierentiate the action between the types of incumbents and he does not
try to aect the election. Notice that Definition 2.1 permits type S not to
act truthfully when the incumbent sets the out-of-equilibrium tax. The next
lemma will allow the analysis to focus on the incentive comparable strategy to
characterise the PBE.
Lemma 2.2. Consider the game with the bureaucrat’s political power and a case of
conflict of interests. In any PBE, type S’s strategy satisfies incentive compatibility.
Intuition of the proof is as follows. If type S’s strategy is not incentive com-
patible, she tries to aect the election by manipulating information available to
voters. However, the condition that voters’ updated beliefs should be consis-
tent with the equilibrium strategies implies that voters detect type S’s attempt
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on the equilibrium path. Thus, only the incentive compatible strategies are
consistent with the Bayes’ update.
Lemma 2.2 implies that, in any PBE, the type S bureaucrat cannot manip-
ulate information about the type of the incumbent. On the equilibrium path,
the type S bureaucrat uses all taxation to produce the maximal size of public
goods.
Note that from Lemma 2.2, in any PBE, the type U politician still chooses
the tax that type I chooses at cost , i.e., SU1 = 
S
I1().
The next lemma shows the incentive compatible strategy can be written as
two conditions.
Lemma 2.3. Consider the game with the bureaucrat’s political power and a case of
conflict of interests. The type S bureaucrat’s strategy is incentive compatible if and
only if PBE taxes the type I politician chooses, SI1() and 
S
I1(), satisfy the following
two conditions:
gˆ(SI1();) + SG2(I)  gˆ(SI1();) + SG˜2; (2.7)
and
gˆ(SI1();) + SG˜2  gˆ(SI1();) + SG2(U): (2.8)
Intuition of the proof is as follows. At , type S can disguise the current
cost as . Suppose that  is realised and the incumbent is type I. Notice that,
from Lemma 2.2 and an equilibrium condition, the equilibrium voting strategy
satisfies S(gˆ(SI1();); 
S
I1()) = 1 and 
S(gˆ(SI1();); 
S
I1()) = 0. If the type S
bureaucrat chooses full production to satisfy incentive compatibility, he then
gets gˆ(SI1();) + SG2(I). However, the type S bureaucrat may try not to re-
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elect the incumbent by choosing gˆ(SI1();) rather than gˆ(
S
I1();).
18 Voters,
in this case, are deceived into believing that the incumbent is type U, and they
dismiss the incumbent. Then, the type S bureaucrat gets gˆ(SI1();) + SG˜2.
Thus, the incentive compatible strategy must satisfy condition (2.7). Note that
to dismiss the incumbent, the bureaucrat must abandon the extra taxation,
SI1()   gˆ( f b();) > 0, which is economically inecient. The one-period
deviation from the the incentive compatible strategy is not profitable for the
current payo while it is profitable for the future rent.
Condition (2.7) can be rewritten as
SI1()    S(1   )(   )(G2(U)   G2(I))=: (2.9)
Under the assumption of the linear cost of producing public goods, if the
incumbent sets the high tax, type S needs to abandon the large amount of
taxation to manipulate the election. Then, the gain from manipulating the
election does not cover the wasted taxation if the imposed tax is suciently
high.
If, instead, the incumbent is type U, the type S bureaucrat has an incentive
to re-elect the incumbent at . Similar reasoning to the above can be applied to
obtain condition (2.8) for the incentive compatible strategy. The condition can
be also rewritten as
SI1()    S(   )(G2(U)   G2(I))=: (2.10)
From both conditions (2.9) and (2.10), the tax type I chooses is upwardly
18Notice that gˆ(SI1();) may not be the minimum level of public goods to be required
for firing the incumbent. The minimum level should depend on the voter’s o-equilibrium
beliefs. However, proof of Lemma2.3 inAppendix shows that checkingdeviation to gˆ( f b();)
is sucient.
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restricted, compared with the PBE tax without the bureaucrat’s political power
in Proposition 2.3. The next proposition summarises the discussion.19
Proposition 2.5. Consider the game with the bureaucrat’s political power and the
case of conflict of interests. In the semi-separating PBE, the tax the type I politician
chooses is anything satisfying SI1()   and SI1()   The tax type U chooses is
SU1 = 
S
I1(). The type S bureaucrat chooses the incentive compatible strategy. On
the equilibrium path, while type I is always re-elected at any state, type U is re-elected
only at .
I now characterise PE. It is not obvious that PE is a semi-separating equilib-
rium since the fist-best policies may not be implementable by type I. The next
proposition shows that PE is a semi-separating PBE, and while the first-best
tax at  is implementable, the first-best tax at may not be implementable.
Proposition 2.6. Consider the game with the bureaucrat’s political power and the case
of conflict of interests. PE is the semi-separating equilibrium such that type I chooses
 f b() at  and maxf f b(); g at , and type U chooses  f b(). The first-best tax at
 is implemented when S is low and/or  is high.
Proposition 2.6 shows that, at , type I can perfectly control the bureaucrat
who tends to overproduce public goods. Intuitively, if type U chose  f b() at
cost , the type S bureaucrat does not help type U to disguise herself as type
I since the cost of information manipulation, gˆ( f b();)   gˆ( f b();), is huge.
At , even type I cannot impose the first-best tax when  f b() < . In this case,
if type I chooses the first-best tax, she cannot get re-elected in the election since
the type S bureaucrat manipulates the information. Then, the PE tax at  is
higher than the first-best to avoid the strategic bureaucrat’s manipulation, so
that public goods are overproduced.
19Similar to footnote 14, there also exist pooling PBE which support any level of first-period
taxes.
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The condition for the first-best tax at  is intuitive. If S is low, type S does
not much care about the result of the election. High  implies that even if type
S successfully dismisses the type I incumbent, the probability of the challenger
being type I is high.
Moe (2006) conjectures that if the bureaucrat has sucient political power,
the political authority would reduce control and choose the policies more
favourable to the bureaucrat. The model confirms Moe’s prediction if  f b() <
. Furthermore, in this case, voters’ expected payos in PE decreases com-
pared with their payos in PE without the political power shown in Proposi-
tion 2.4. Thus, the implemented policies are favourable to the bureaucrat and
unfavourable to voters.20
Japanese politics has not reduced wasteful public spending caused by bu-
reaucrats, although politicians has recognised it. The wasteful public spending
would have been a compromise between politicians and bureaucrats. In fact,
before the Koizumi administration, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which
had ruled Japan formore than a half century, had established an?iron triangle?
with bureaucrats and business, which was criticized as one of the causes of the
wasteful public spending.
Finally, in spite of the ineciency of bureaucracies, the model with the
bureaucrat’s political power stillmaintains the role of the bureaucrat to enhance
the selection mechanism of the election. The semi-separating PE in this section
still has an advantage for selecting politicians comparedwith pooling PE in the
non-hierarchical government in Proposition 2.2.
20Although bureaucracies lead to oversized governments, bureaucracies are not totally in-
ecient, as shown by Niskanen (1971). While the model in Niskanen (1971) predicts that
governments can become oversized at any time, this chapter shows that, at , the type I
politician still can appropriately control the size of government.
38
2.4.3 Case (II): Alignment of Interests
Consider a case of alignment of interests by assuming  f b() <  f b(). Voters’
preference over types of incumbents is the same as the strategic bureaucrat’s
preference.
In PBE satisfying intuitive criterion, the type S bureaucrat can send a credi-
ble signal about the type of the incumbent to voters. Since voters and the type
S bureaucrat would like to re-elect the type I incumbent and dismiss type U,
the type S bureaucrat have an incentive to perfectly inform voters of the type
of the incumbent. Hence, voters should believe the signal type S sends.
Consider the example that type U chooses SU1 = 
S
I1(). The intuitive
criterion says that when policy (gˆ(SI1();)   ; SG1()) is implemented, voters
should believe that the type of the incumbent is U with a probability of one.
This is because only the type S bureaucrat working with the typeU incumbent
would like to deviate from full production to gˆ( f b();)    if voters fire the
incumbent. Note that, since the portion of type H is strictly positive, the type
U politician still chooses the tax that type I chooses at cost .
The following proposition characterises semi-separating PBE.21
Proposition 2.7. Consider the game with the bureaucrat’s political power and a case of
alignment of interests. Semi-separating PBE supports any level of taxes type I chooses
in the first period. Type U chooses SU1 = 
S
I1(). On the equilibrium path, when the
first-period incumbent is type I, or is type U and the cost of public goods is , the type
S bureaucrat chooses full production. When the incumbent is type U and the cost is ,
type S chooses gSS1(
S
U1;;U) = gˆ(
S
U1;)   . While type I is always re-elected, type
U is re-elected only when the bureaucrat is type H and the cost is .
21Again, there also exist pooling PBEwhich support any level of taxes. When the incumbent
is type U, type S chooses gSS1(
S
U1;1;U) = gˆ(
S
U1;1)    as in the semi-separating PBE. There
also exists pooling PBE such that type S chooses the incentive compatible strategy under type
U and chooses gSS1(
S
I1;1; I) = gˆ(
S
I1;1)    under type I.
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Amain implication of the proposition, whichwill be also discussed in detail
below, is that the type U politician cannot get re-elected when the bureaucrat
is type S.
Since there exists a PBE such that the type I politician implements the first-
best policy, it is the PE.
Proposition 2.8. Consider the game with the bureaucrat’s political power and a case of
alignment of interests. PE is the semi-separating equilibrium such that type I chooses
the first-best tax and type U chooses  f b(). Type S chooses equilibrium action denoted
by Proposition 2.7.
The main point of PE is that political selection works better than in the
game without the political power shown in Proposition 2.4. Even though type
U can successfully choose the first-best tax, the type S bureaucrat exercises the
political power to dismiss her. The type U incumbent can get re-elected only
under the typeH bureaucrat and the high cost of public goods. The equilibrium
probability of type U being re-elected is p, while that in the game without
political power is p, which is strictly larger than p. When the probability of
type S approaches 1 i.e., when  approaches 0, the selection mechanism of the
election would become perfect.
Tullock (2002) descriptively argues that the bureaucrat would leak infor-
mation unpleasant to the incumbent without any cost to harm her reputation.
The equilibrium in this section presents the theoretical foundation of the bu-
reaucrat’s information-leak strategy. Notice that the information-leak strategy
works in equilibrium only when the environment fits an alignment of interests.
In the case of a conflict of interests, the strategic bureaucrat has an incentive to
hide information concerning the type of incumbents.
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2.5 Political Appointees
This section studies whether the political appointment system can eliminate
bureaucrats’ political power. Muller (2008) argues that the spoils system is
the one to mitigate bureaucrats’ incentive to sabotage.22 Since the top of the
executive branch, the president or the prime minister, appoints her preferred
top bureaucrats, preference of the ruling politicians and the bureaucrats would
be expected to be similar.
The following sections focus on the two kinds of characteristics of political
appointees. Section 2.5.1 examines which type of bureaucrats the incumbent
would appoint (the appointment problem). Section 2.5.2 considers the non-
guaranteed status of the politically appointed bureaucrat. In the U.S., after the
incumbent loses an election, the politically appointed bureaucrats also resign.
Section 2.5.3 evaluates the political appointment system.
2.5.1 Appointment problem
This section studies the incumbent’s appointment problem among civil ser-
vants. In France, themembers of the grands corps are appointed to high-ranking
positions in ministerial cabinets, and the political appointees from outside of
the government are relatively few in number.23 Even if the incumbent loses an
election, it is guaranteed that politically appointed bureaucrats can return to
their positions in the grands corps.
Themodel ismodified as follows. Before the cost of public goods is realised,
the incumbent appoints a public servant as a top bureaucrat. There exist two
types of candidates for appointment, fH˜; S˜g, where H˜ denotes an honest servant
22Suleiman (2003) argues for a growing trend of politicization of bureaucracies in U.S.,
France, Japan, U.K., Germany and Spain.
23See Suleiman (2003) and Rouban (2004)
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and S˜ denotes a strategic servant. The incumbent observes the type of servants
when appointing. Voters do not observe the incumbent’s choice of servants.
An appointed servant turns out to be either a typeH bureaucrat or a type Swith
the following probability: PrfHjH˜g =  2 (; 1) and PrfHjS˜g =  2 (0; ). The
probability implies that if the incumbent appoints the type H˜ candidate, then
the candidate is more likely to be the typeH bureaucrat than in the last section.
Furthermore, even if the incumbent loses an election, the appointed bureaucrat
can still keep a position as a public servant and obtain the same second-period
payos as in the previous sections, although he loses the right to choose public
goods. After political appointment, the game follows the same timing as the
game of hierarchical government.24
Consider, first, a case of conflict of interests. Since voters do not observe the
type of the appointed servant, choice of political appointees does not become
a signal about the type of the incumbent. Remember that type S’s incentive
compatible condition (2.7) in the last section was independent of . Thus,
due to the uncertainty of the type of appointed bureaucrat, represented by
 < 1, political appointment does not help to mitigate the incentive compatible
condition, so that the semi-separating PBE policies and the PE policy are the
same as in the last section.25 Furthermore, since, in the last section, the re-
electionprobability of the type I politicianwas 1 and that of the typeU politician
was p, both of which were also independent of , political appointment does
not aect both politicians’ PBE payos.
Next, consider a case of alignment of interests. In this case, by the same
reason as in the case of conflict of interests, the semi-separating PBE policies
24Political appointment at the second period does not aect politicians’ second-period payo
since both types of bureaucrats chooses full production. Thus, it does notmatter for the analysis
whether the position of bureaucrats as political appointees is securedwhen the incumbentwins
the election
25Pooling PBE policies also do not change.
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and the PE policy are the same as in the last section. However, in any PBE,
the type U incumbent appoints the type H˜ servant since the incumbent can
get re-elected with the higher probability when appointing type H˜ than when
appointing type S˜.26 Then, in semi-separating PBE, the probability of her
re-election becomes p, which is higher than p, the re-election probability
without political appointees. Thus, political appointees only contribute to the
persistence of the inecient government.
The next proposition summarises the above discussion.
Proposition 2.9. Consider the game of the appointment problem. The set of the semi-
separating PBE policies is the same as that in the game with bureaucrats’ political
power denoted by Proposition 2.5 and 2.7. PE policy is also the same as in Proposition
2.6 and 2.7. In the case of the conflict of interests, both types of politicians are indierent
between appointing type H˜ and type S˜. In the case of alignment of interests, type U
always appoints the type H˜ servant, and she can get re-elected with a higher probability
than that without political appointees.
Since the only dierence from PE without political appointees is the per-
sistence of the inecient government, evaluation of political appointees from
this analysis is negative.
Next, consider the case of perfect accuracy of the bureaucrat’s type, i.e.,
 =  = 1. In the case of the conflict of interests, by appointing type H˜,
the type I incumbent can implement the first-best policies at , even though
the condition  f b()   does not hold. This is because the type I politician
is no longer worried about the bureaucrat’s sabotage to dismiss her. The
implementable taxes at high cost  are, however, still restricted as in (2.10)
26Notice that if type U appoints the type S˜ servant, then type U can get re-elected only with
probability of p.
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since typeU cooperates with the type S bureaucrat whomay try to manipulate
information.
In the case of alignment of interests, type U appoints the type H˜ servant
to prevent the type S bureaucrat from sending information about her type to
voters. Then, by imposing the tax that type I chooses at , type U can get
re-elected with probability p. If, instead, type U appoints the type S˜ servant,
then her re-election probability would be 0.
Finally, since PBE supports the first-best policy by the type I incumbent, it
is the PE.27 The following proposition summarises the above argument.
Proposition 2.10. Consider the game of the appointment problem with perfect accu-
racy. Suppose that it is the conflict of interests case. In the semi-separating PBE, the
tax type I sets can be any level at  and any level higher than  at . To implement
tax less than , type I should appoint type H˜. Type S, if appointed, chooses incentive
compatible strategy. In PE, which is a semi-separating PBE, type I appoints type H˜
and can implement the first-best policy. Suppose, instead, that it is the alignment of
interests case. In the semi-separating PBE, type U appoints type H˜. Then, the equilib-
rium policies are the same as in the game without political power shown in Proposition
2.3. The PE policies are also same as in Proposition 2.4.
Propositions 2.9 and 2.10 imply that voters obtain the positive eect of the
political appointees only when politicians have perfectly accurate information
on the type of bureaucrats. In many countries, to reduce the uncertainty of
the type of appointed bureaucrats, the incumbent appoints people personally
27There exists separating PBE. Suppose that type I appoints type S˜ and implements policies
such as (gˆ( f b(1);1) ;  f b(1)) for any1. Further suppose that voters re-elect the incumbent
only when policies (gˆ( f b(1);1)   ;  f b(1)) for any  are implemented. In this case, type U
cannot get re-elected whoever she appoints. Thus, type U imposes e to maximise her second
objective. The update belief is consistent with equilibrium actions and satisfies intuitive
criterion. However, since type I would like to implement the first-best policy, this separating
PBE is not PE.
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well acquainted. In France, although the majority members of the grands corps
does not show obvious political aliations, they become involved in politics
by participating in political circles and showing their loyalty and competence
(Suleiman, 2003). Such activity would be not only for the high civil servants to
be promoted, but also for the politicians to distinguish the type of civil servants.
2.5.2 Non-guaranteed status of political appointees
Although a position of public servants, who are employed based on a merit
system, regarding tenure is generally guaranteed in many countries, the polit-
ical appointees would not be tenured. For example, in the U.S., the president
politically appoints from outside of the government, and, after she loses the
presidential election, the all political appointees also resign. This section stud-
ies the case in which the politically appointed bureaucrat shares his fate with
the incumbent appointing him.
The model in section 2.4 is modified as follows. If the incumbent loses the
election, the appointed bureaucrat is also replaced and gets exogenous payo
G at the second period. The outside option is less attractive than keeping
the position, i.e., G < minfG2(I);G2(U)g. Then, at the beginning of the second
period, nature chooses the new bureaucrat. Note that the incumbent does not
choose the bureaucrat. Politicians, again, do not know the bureaucrat’s type.28
Let ffRitgi2fI;Ug;t2f1;2g; fgRjtg j2fH;Sg;t2f1;2g; Rg denote a profile of the PBE strategies of
the game with replacement of bureaucrats. The main dierence is the strategy
of the type S bureaucrat at the first period. Since the bureaucrat resigns if the
28The assumption is irrelevant to get the following results.
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incumbent loses the election, his strategy is, instead of (2.6),
gRS1(1;1; i1) = arg maxg:  1g0
g+ S
n
R(g; 1)G2(i1) + [1   R(g; 1)]G
o
: (2.11)
Since G < G˜2, the type S bureaucrat more likely swears allegiance to the in-
cumbent when appointed than when having a tenured position. The separate
analysis into conflict of interests and alignment of interests is not appropriate
since the appointed bureaucrat does not have an incentive to fire the incumbent.
Even in this game, Lemma 2.2 still holds in any semi-separating PBE.29 The
incentive compatible condition such that the type S bureaucrat does not try to
re-elect the type U incumbent at  is changed from (2.8) to
gˆ(RI1();) + SG  gˆ(RI1();) + SG2(U): (2.12)
Then (2.10) is also replaced with
RI1()  ˜  S(G2(U)   G)=(   ): (2.13)
Since G < G˜2, it holds that ˜ > . Thus, the higher tax is needed to make the
strategic bureaucrat truthful. Notice that threshold tax ˜ decreases in outside
optionG. Thus, if the outside option becomesmore attractive to the bureaucrat,
then the smaller tax becomes implementable at state .
The following proposition characterises semi-separating PBE.30
29See proof of Proposition 2.11 in Appendix 2.7.
30There also exist pooling PBE which support any level of taxes and full production of
public goods. Furthermore, in the case of alignment of interests, there exist pooling PBE
such that the type S bureaucrat does not choose the incentive compatible strategy. Under the
PBE tax larger than S(G2(U)   G), type S working under type I at  chooses gRS1(RI1;;G) =
gˆ(RI1;)   S(G2(U)   G). Type S working under type I at  and working under type U at any
cost chooses full production.
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Proposition 2.11. Consider the game with replacement of the bureaucrat. In the semi-
separating PBE, the tax type I chooses can be any level at , and any level higher than
˜ at . Type U chooses RU1 = 
R
I1(). The type S bureaucrat chooses full production on
the equilibrium path. While type I is always re-elected at any cost, type U is re-elected
only at .
Notice that the first-best tax at  is implementable by type I, even if the
condition  f b()   does not hold. This is because the type S bureaucrat
prefers to help the type I incumbent win rather than dismiss her even at the
case of conflict of interests. However, since the bias toward a high budget at
state , shown by (2.13), becomes larger in this case than in the model without
political appointment, shown by (2.10), it may not be assured that the first-best
tax at  is implementable.
Let max = maxf f b(); ˜g. The next proposition characterises the PE.
Proposition 2.12. Consider the game with replacement of the bureaucrat. In PE, the
type S bureaucrat uses the incentive compatible strategy. Suppose that p[u(gˆ(max;)) 
max] + (1   p)[u(gˆ( f b();))    f b()]  Eu(gˆ(e;))   e. PE is a semi-separating
PBE such that type I chooses max at  and  f b() at  and type U chooses max. Then,
while type I is always re-elected at any cost, type U is re-elected only at . Suppose
that the above inequality does not hold. PE is a pooling PBE such that the equilibrium
tax is e. Then, both types of politicians are always re-elected.
In the pooling PE case, the strong loyalties of the appointed bureaucrat
to type U force voters to bear the burden such that political selection does
not work. In this case, the bureaucrat has strong incentive for manipulating
information so as to re-elect type U, i.e., ˜ is quite high. Since ˜ decreases
in outside option G, if the replaced bureaucrat can obtain a suciently high
payo at the second period, then political appointment may assure the semi-
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separating PEwith the first-best tax. In the U.S., the president usually appoints
politicians and advisors in her political party, and professors and intellectuals
well known in their fields. Their outside options might be high enough to
obtain a positive eect from the political appointment system.
2.5.3 Evaluation of the political appointment system
The last two subsections have analysed how the two dierent characteristics of
political appointees aect the bureaucrat’s political power. The key assump-
tions to implement the first-best policy are that the incumbent needs to know
perfectly the characteristics of the candidates, or that the appointed bureaucrat
needs to have the high value of outside option.
To discuss further the advantages and disadvantages of the political ap-
pointment system, consider the case where, using political appointees, type I
can implement the first-best policy in PE. Suppose, first, that it is the conflict
of interests case. If the condition  f b()   holds, the political appointees are
irrelevant. Suppose, instead, the condition does not hold. Then, political ap-
pointees benefit voters since the first-best policy now becomes implementable.
Next, consider the case of alignment of interests. Notice that political ap-
pointees weaken the selection eect of election since the type U incumbent
is more likely to get re-elected under the political appointment system than
without it. Persistence of the inecient government under political appointees
decreases voters’ expected payo. Therefore, the political appointment system
is eective only in the case of the conflict of interests.
In Japan, a former prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, actively used the
CEFP, which consisted of political appointees, and furthermore increased the
number of political appointees in government. A cause of wasteful public
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spending has been said to be bureaucrats’ huge discretion over policy making.
The CEFP designed an annual budget which contributed for improving fiscal
consolidation and promoting structural reform. The increased number of po-
litical appointees helped implementing the policies and reforms that the CEFP
outlined.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has studied how bureaucracy aects political accountability and
implemented policies. Bureaucrats’ policymaking discretion gives voters ad-
ditional information about incumbents, which contributes to avoid pooling
equilibrium. This is because mismanagement of bureaucracy becomes a signal
of the incumbent being incompetence.
Bureaucrats’ political power leads to the dierent conclusions in terms of
bureaucrats’ indirect preference over politicians. When voters and bureaucrats
prefer the dierent types of politicians, the incumbent chooses larger budget
than the first-best level so as to prevent bureaucrats frommanipulating election.
Thus, voters suer a cost of the oversized government. Instead, when voters
and bureaucrats have the same preferences, bureaucrats can always send a
credible signal to voters to identify the type of the incumbent. Thus, voters gain
a benefit of the enhanced selection mechanism of election. Furthermore, the
political appointment system can mitigate bureaucrats’ political power, which
benefits voters only in the case of conflict of interests. In the case of alignment of
interests, political appointees make incompetent government more persistent.
This chapter leaves some important extensions for future work. First, bu-
reaucrats aremotivated by the incentive of career concerns (Tirole, 1994; Dewa-
tripont et al., 1999) and/or intrinsically motivated for public interests (Wilson,
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1989; Besley andGhatak, 2005). These can contribute to preventing bureaucrats
from strategically using their political power. Second, based on this positive
analysis, future work needs normative analysis which examines what kinds of
institutions could eectively mitigate and use the bureaucrats’ political power.
2.7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1
At first, notice that, given 1 and 1, both types of politicians choose the same
level of public goods, i.e., gNI1(1;1) = g
N
U1(1;1). Furthermore, there exists no
separating PBE. These are because, if any, voters can instantaneously identify
the type of incumbents, which is not optimal for type U.
Now, I show that there exist only pooling PBE. Suppose that there exists a
semi-separating equilibrium such that type I chooses NI1() , 
N
U1() and type
U chooses NU1 = 
N
I1(). Suppose that voters re-elect the incumbent if policy
(gNI1(
N
I1();); I1()) is implemented. I derive a contradiction since voters’
posterior belief about the incumbent is now ˜(gNI1(
N
I1();); I1()) = p=(p +
1   ) < , which implies that voters should dismiss the incumbent.
Then, suppose that voters do not re-elect the incumbent if the implemented
policy is (gNI1(
N
I1();); I1()). Note that, since type U does not choose 
N
I1(),
voters should re-elect if policy (gNI1(
N
I1();); I1()) is implemented. Then, type
U optimallydeviates from tax NI1() to tax 
N
I1() since she canget re-electedwith
positive probability. Thus, the argument, again, derives contraction. Hence,
there exists no semi-separating PBE such that type I chooses NI1() , 
N
I1() and
type U chooses NU1 = 
N
I1().
A similar argument can be applied to prove that there exists no semi-
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separating PBE such that type I chooses NI1() , 
N
I1() and type U chooses
NU1 = 
N
I1().
Finally, I show that the pooling PBE supports any level of taxes and any
implementable size of public goods. Suppose that voters re-elect the incumbent
only when policy (g(1); ) is implemented for any 1 where g(1)  gˆ(;1).
Then, the both types of politicians optimally choose (g(1); ) dependent on 1.
Given this action, the voting strategy is optimal for voters.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
At first, consider the case where strategies of politicians are HI1() , 
H
I1() =
HU1. The strategies can be supported by PBE if the o equilibrium belief
˜(gˆ(HI1();); 
H
I1()) is strictly less than . Then, voters’ update beliefs on the
equilibrium path satisfies ˜(gˆ(HI1();); 
H
I1()) = , ˜(gˆ(
H
I1();); 
H
I1()) = 1,
and ˜(gˆ(HI1();); 
H
I1()) = 0. Thus, while type I is always re-elected at any
states, type U is re-elected only at .
Next, I show that the above type of PBE is the only semi-separating PBE.
Suppose that there exists a semi-separating PBE such that the first-period
taxes are HI1() , 
H
I1() = 
H
U1. The on-equilibrium updated beliefs are
˜(gˆ(HI1();); 
H
I1()) = , ˜(gˆ(
H
I1();); 
H
I1()) = 1, and ˜(gˆ(
H
I1();); 
H
I1()) =
0. Then, the equilibrium probability of type U’s re-election is Pr() = 1   p.
Now, consider the case where type U deviates her action from HI1() to 
H
I1().
In this case, given voters’ strategy, the re-election probability of type U is at
least greater than Pr() = p, which is greater than equilibrium probability of
her re-election. Thus, it leads to a contradiction.
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Proof of Lemma 2.1
At first, note that gˆ(e;) < gˆ( f b();) < gˆ( f b();) < gˆ(e;) when  f b() <
 f b() and gˆ( f b();) < gˆ(e;) < gˆ(e;) < gˆ( f b();) when  f b() <  f b().
Furthermore, from the first order condition, ug(gˆ( f b();))= = 1, and then,
gˆ( f b();) = ug 1().
Let   ug(gˆ(e;))= and   ug(gˆ(e;))=. Note that  and  are unique
because the second derivative of u is always negative. Thus, gˆ(e;) = ug 1()
and gˆ(e;) = ug 1(). Further, note that  > 1 and  < 1 when  f b() >  f b(),
and  < 1 and  > 1 when  f b() <  f b(). From the first order condition with
respect to e, pug(gˆ(e;))= + (1   p)ug(gˆ(e;))=   1 = 0. Then, the above
equation can be rewritten as p + (1   p) = 1.
Suppose that  f b() >  f b(). Note that since the third derivative of u is
non-negative, function ug 1() is convex. Thus, it holds that
ug 1()   ug 1()
(1   ) 
ug 1()   ug 1()
(   1) :
Furthermore, since p+(1 p) < p+(1 p), it holds that (1 )=( 1) <
p=(1   p). Thus,
G2(I) = pug 1() + (1   p)ug 1() < pug 1() + (1   p)ug 1() = G2(U):
Further, by the similar arguments, if  f b() <  f b(),
G2(I) = pug 1() + (1   p)ug 1() > pug 1() + (1   p)ug 1() = G2(U):
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Proof of Lemma 2.2
I can divide possible equilibria into the three cases: The first two cases are for
the semi-separating equilibria and the last is for the pooling equilibria. Note
that there exists no separating equilibrium in this game.
(A): Suppose that, in PBE, SI1() , 
S
I1() = 
S
U1. First, suppose that type S
produces gSS1(
S
I1();; I) < gˆ(
S
I1();). Since ˜(g
S
S1(
S
I1();; I); I1()) = 1 from
the Bayes rule, the type I incumbent working with the type S bureaucrat is
re-elected at . Then, choosing gSS1(
S
I1();; I) is not best response to type S.
Therefore, it holds that gSS1(
S
I1();; I) = gˆ(
S
I1();).
Next, suppose that gSS1(
S
U1;;U) < gˆ(
S
U1;). Notice that 
S(gˆ(SU1;); 
S
U1) =
0. Then, it should hold that S(gSS1(
S
U1;;U); 
S
U1) = 1, i.e., the updated
on-equilibrium belief should be ˜(gSS1(
S
U1;;U); 
S
U1)  . Hence, in this
case, it should hold that gSS1(
S
U1;;U)  gˆ(SU1;). Suppose, further, that
gSS1(
S
U1;;U) = gˆ(
S
U1;). However, since type S working under the type U
incumbent chooses gSS1(
S
U1;;U) = gˆ(
S
U1;), the updated belief is at most
p=[p+p(1 )+ (1 p)(1 )(1 )], which is strictly less than . Suppose, in-
stead, that gSS1(
S
U1;;U) < gˆ(
S
U1;). Note that it holds that
S(gˆ(SU1;); 
S
U1) = 1.
Then, typeSobtain thepositivegainbydeviating from gSS1(
S
U1;;U) to gˆ(
S
U1;).
Thus, it holds that gSS1(
S
U1;;U) = gˆ(
S
U1;).
Suppose that gSS1(
S
U1;;U) < gˆ(
S
U1;). From theBayes update, voters’ belief
S(gˆ(SU1;); 
S
U1) is equal to 1. Then, a deviation from g
S
S1(
S
U1;;U) to gˆ(
S
U1;) is
profitable to the type S bureaucrat. Thus, it holds that gSS1(
S
U1;;U) = gˆ(
S
U1;).
Finally, suppose that gSS1(
S
I1();; I) < gˆ(
S
I1();). From the above argument
and the Bayes rule, it holds that S(gˆ(SI1();); 
S
I1()) = 0. Then, again, a de-
viation from gSS1(
S
I1();; I) to gˆ(
S
I1();) is profitable to the type S bureaucrat.
Thus, it holds that gSS1(
S
I1();; I) = gˆ(
S
I1();).
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(B): Suppose that in PBE, SI1() , 
S
I1() = 
S
U1. Although, similarly to (A), it
can be proved that type S chooses the incentive compatible strategy, this type
of PBE does not exist. Type U would like to deviate from SI1() to 
S
I1() since
her probability of re-election increases from 1 p to pwhich is greater than 1=2.
(C): Finally, suppose that in PBE, SI1() = 
S
I1() = 
S
U1. Again, the similar
proof to case (A) can be applied to prove the type S’s incentive compatible
strategy.
Proof of Lemma 2.3
First, consider the “if” part. From Lemma 2.2, if taxes, SI1() and 
S
I1(), are
supported by some PBE, then the type S bureaucrat chooses the incentive
compatible strategy.
Next, consider the “only if” part. Suppose that type S chooses the in-
centive compatible strategy. Notice that, from Lemma 2.2 and the Bayes
rule, the equilibrium voting strategy satisfies S(gˆ(SI1();); 
S
I1()) = 1 and
S(gˆ(SI1();); 
S
I1()) = 0. Consider the case where the incumbent is type I and
the cost is. Then, if type S chooses the full production to satisfy incentive com-
patibility, he then gets gˆ(SI1();)+ SG2(I). Let g˜ = gˆ(
S
I1();)  S[G˜2  G2(I)].
Condition that type S chooses the full production is such that for any g 2
(g˜; gˆ(SI1();)), the voting strategy satisfies 
S(g; SI1()) = 1. Notice that the
o-equilibrium beliefs do not violate the intuitive criterion. Thus, in PBE, it
should hold that g˜  gˆ(SI1();), which is the same as condition (2.7). Finally,
condition (2.8) can be obtained as the similar way to the above.
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Proof of Proposition 2.5
From Lemma 2.2 and 2.3, in any PBE, taxes the type I politician chooses satisfy
condition (2.9) and (2.10). Furthermore, since incentive compatibility is defined
on the equilibrium, any taxes, which type I chooses at , larger than , and any
taxes, which type I chooses at , larger than  are supported by some PBE.
Proof of Proposition 2.6
First, I show the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4. Consider the game with the bureaucrat’s political power and the case of
the conflict of interests. It holds that  f b() >  and e > .
Proof. First, I show the first inequality. Note that G2(U) < pgˆ( f b();) + (1  
p)gˆ( f b();). Then,
gˆ( f b();)   gˆ( f b();)   S[G2(U)   G2(I)]
> gˆ( f b();)   gˆ( f b();)   S(1   p)[gˆ( f b();)   gˆ( f b();)] > 0:
The last inequality holds because gˆ( f b();) > gˆ( f b();). Hence, it holds
that  f b() > .
Next, I show the second inequality. Note that G2(U) < pgˆ( f b();) + (1  
p)gˆ(e;). Then,
gˆ(e;)   gˆ(e;)   S[G2(U)   G2(I)]
> gˆ(e;)   gˆ(e;)   S(1   p)[gˆ(e;)   gˆ( f b();)] > 0:
The last inequality holds because gˆ( f b();) > gˆ( f b();)  gˆ(e;). Hence, it
hods that e > . 
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From Lemma 2.4, the following inequality holds;
p[u(gˆ( f b();))    f b()] + (1   p)[u(gˆ(maxf f b(); g;))  maxf f b(); g]
> p[u(gˆ( f b();))    f b()] + (1   p)[u(gˆ(e;))   e]
> p[u(gˆ(e;))   e] + (1   p)[u(gˆ(e;))   e]
Then, the political equilibrium is a semi-separating equilibrium denoted in this
proposition.
Finally, consider the condition  f b()  . If S(1   )(G2(U)2   G2(I)) is
suciently small, the condition holds. Then, if S is suciently small and/or 
is suciently high, the condition holds.
Proof of Proposition 2.7
Suppose that PBE taxes are SI1() , 
S
I1() = 
S
U1. Notice that the type S
bureaucrat working the type I incumbent chooses gSS1(
S
I1();; I) = gˆ(
S
I1();)
at . If otherwise, type S obtains a gain by deviating to full production since
S(gˆ(SI1();); 
S
I1()) is 1. Furthermore, it should hold that type S working
with the type U incumbent chooses gSS1(
S
U1;;U) = gˆ(
S
U1;) at .
Suppose that the type S bureaucrat working with the type I incumbent
chooses the public goods gSS1(
S
I1();; I) < gˆ(
S
I1();) at . In this case, it
should hold that the voting strategy is S(gˆ(SI1();); 
S
I1()) = 0. Then, type
S working with the type U incumbent chooses gSS1(
S
I1();;U) = gˆ(
S
I1();) at
. Hence, the equilibrium probability of re-election for type U is equal to 0. If
type U chooses SI1() rather than 
S
I1(), then the probability of her re-election
is (1   p). Thus, type U’s strategy of SU1 = SI1() is not best response. Hence,
it holds that gSS1(
S
I1();; I) = gˆ(
S
I1();).
Now, suppose that the type S bureaucrat working with the type U incum-
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bent chooses gSS1(
S
U1;;U) = gˆ(
S
U1;) at . Notice that 
S(gˆ(SU1;); 
S
U1) = 1.
However, those strategies violate the intuitive criterion. The PBE action of type
Sworkingwith the typeU incumbent should choose gSS1(
S
U1;;U) = gˆ(
S
U1;) 
at .
Finally, notice that there exist no PBE such that SI1() , 
S
I1() = 
S
U1. If it
exits, the type U politician prefer to deviate from SI1() to 
S
I1().
Proof of Proposition 2.10
First, consider a case of conflict of interests. I show that, in anyPBE such that the
type I politician appoints the type S˜ servant, the politician is indierent between
appointing type S˜ and type H˜. Suppose that the type I politician appoints the
type S˜ servant. Notice that, on equilibrium path, type S’s strategy should be
incentive compatible, that is, type S chooses full production. Thus, even if type
I appointed type H˜, type I can implement the same PBE policy by choosing the
PBE tax. Hence, in this case, type I is indierent about appointment. Then,
the analysis can be restricted to the case where type I appoints the type H˜
incumbent. Furthermore, in any PBE, type U is indierent about appointment
by the same reason discussed above.
Thus, in any PBE, only incentive compatibility condition (2.10) should be
satisfied. Then, the PBE policy is the one denoted in this proposition.
Next, consider a case of alignment of interests. Notice that in any PBE, type I
is indierent about appointment since she can always get re-electedwhomever
she appoints. Suppose that typeU appoints type S˜. Then, the intuitive criterion
implies that type U is never re-elected. However, by appointing type H˜ and
imposing the tax that type I chooses at , type U can get re-elected with prob-
ability p. Thus, in any PBE, type U appoints type H˜, and then the equilibrium
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policy is the same as in the game without political power.
Proof of Proposition 2.11
Atfirst, I show that typeS chooses the incentive compatible strategy in the semi-
separating PBE. Consider the semi-separating equilibrium such that RI1() ,
RI1() = 
R
U1. Note that at , type S appointed by type I chooses full production.
Suppose that R(gˆ(RI1();); 
R
I1()) = 0. If type S appointed by typeU does not
choose gˆ(RI1();) for any 1, 
R(gˆ(RI1();); 
R
I1()) should be 1. Thus, suppose
that type S appointed by type U chooses gˆ(RI1();) at some 1. If he chooses
it at , then he would like to deviate to gˆ(RI1();). Then, suppose that type S
appointed by type U chooses gˆ(RI1();) at . Notice that type S appointed by
type U chooses gˆ(RI1();) at . In this case since type U cannot get re-elected
at , her expected probability of re-election is 0. If, instead, type U chooses
RI1(), her expected probability of re-election is 1   p.
Thus, suppose, instead, R(gˆ(RI1();); 
R
I1()) = 1. Then, type S chooses
full production when the incumbent is type I and the cost is , and when the
incumbent is type U and the cost is . Suppose that type S appointed by type
U chooses gˆ(R11();) at . In this case, 
R(gˆ(RI1();); 
R
I1()) = 0. Then, type
S appointed by type U chooses gˆ(RI1();) at . Thus, the bureaucrat always
chooses the incentive compatible strategy in semi-separating PBE.
Notice that, although it can be shown that the bureaucrat chooses the
incentive compatible strategy in the semi-separating equilibrium such that
RI1() = 
R
U1 , 
R
I1(), type U would always like to deviate to 
R
I1(). Thus, such
semi-separating equilibrium does not exist.
Then, the incentive compatible condition RI1()  ˜ needs to hold and the
tax satisfying it can be supported by some belief in PBE.
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Proof of Proposition 2.12
Among the semi-separating PBE, type I’s most preferred equilibrium is such
that she chooses max at  and  f b() at . Then, her expected payo at the first
period is p[u(gˆ(max;))   max] + (1   p)[u(gˆ( f b();))    f b()]. The pooling
PBE such that the politicians choose e and the strategic produces themaximum
amount of public goods is the best for type I among any pooling PBE. Then, her
expected payo at the first period is pu(gˆ(e;)) + (1   p)u(gˆ(e;))   e. Thus,
the proposition holds.
2.8 Appendix: Intuitive Criterion
The intuitive criterion of the game with bureaucrats’ political power in Section
2.4 is defined as follows. Given PBE tax, 1 2 fSI1(); SI1(); SU1g, the game is
a signaling game between the bureaucrat (sender) and voters (receiver). Let
 = f; g  fI;Ug, the element of which is denoted by (1; i1). Furthermore, let
 (g1; 1) be the set equal to  if g1 2 [0; gˆ(1;)], and equal to fg  fI;Ug if g1 2
(gˆ(1;); gˆ(1;)]. Notice that  (g1; 1) shows the set of the type of politicians
and the cost of public goods, under which the bureaucrat can produce public
goods, g1, given tax 1. Let(0) be the set of beliefs over0  , where beliefs
consist of independent probability.
Now, consider an o-equilibrium public goods g1. Thus, from assumption
of o-equilibrium beliefs on bureaucrats, voters believe that the bureaucrat is
type S. Define the voters’ best response to policy (g1; 1), if they have posterior
belief (1; i1) over  (g1; 1), such that
BR(; g1; 1) = arg max
2f0;1g
X
(1;i1)2 (g1;1)
[G2(i1) + (1   )G˜2](1; i1):
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Furthermore, let
BR(0; g1; 1) =
[
2(0)
BR(; g1; 1);
where 0   (g1; 1). Notice that BR(; g1; 1) = f0; 1g.
Given (1; i1) 2 , and incumbent i1’s choice of 1, define the equilibrium
payo of the type S bureaucrat such that
G1(1;1; i1) = gSS1(1;1; i1)
+ S
n
S(gSS1(1;1; i1); 1)G2(i1) + [1   S(gSS1(1;1; i1); 1)]G˜2
o
:
It is said that action o-equilibrium action g1 is equilibrium dominated for type
(1; i1) and tax 1 in a PBE if g1 2 [0; gˆ(1;1)] and
G1(1;1; i1) > g1 + S max
2f0;1g
n
G2(i1) + (1   )G˜2
o
:
For each action g1, let
S(g1; 1) = f(1; i1) 2  (g1; 1) : g1 is equilibrium dominated for (1; i1) and 1g:
Then, PBE is said to fail the intuitive criterion if, given 1, there exist (i1; 1) 2 
and g 2 [0; gˆ(1;1)] such that
G1(1;1; i1) < g + S min
2BR( (g;1)nS(g;1);g;1)
n
G2(i1) + (1   )G˜2
o
:
60
Chapter 3
Credible Commitment and
Economic Growth in Autocracies
3.1 Introduction
Why have some autocrats adopted a successful policy for economic growth,
while others have applied a predatory policy?1 The aim of this chapter is
to provide a theoretical model to show the mechanism and conditions un-
der which a leader in an autocratic state implements a policy for economic
growth. The question is important, since many autocratic countries, especially
in sub-Saharan Africa, remain underdeveloped and suer from a low quality
of government (Collier, 2009).
The political science literature stresses the lack of state capacity in African
countries as a reason for underdevelopment (Migdal, 1988; Herbst, 2000). In
this view, since the African states do not have a sucient capacity to collect
taxes, they cannot provide public goods for economic development, which is
a problem of the weak state. The literature also points out the low quality
1Rodrik (2000) and Besley and Kudamatsu (2008) observe that the variance of economic
performance in autocracies is larger than in democracies.
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of public services provided by African governments despite relatively high
public expenditure (Collier and Gunning, 1999). Further, the governments
have heavily regulated markets, which reduces the incentive of producers for
production.2 This kind of mismanagement of public services can cause an
African growth tragedy (Easterly and Levine, 1997).
East Asian states, in contrast, have successfully adopted market-friendly
policies, such as property rights protection and soundmacroeconomic policies,
and have intervened in the market to direct investment to specific industrial
sectors and avoid coordination failure (World Bank, 1993). To establish their
legitimacy, the leaders have deployed a shared-growth strategy, including the
prevalence of general education, land reform for fair land ownership and hous-
ing assistance for low-income families. The rulers in South Korea andMalaysia
have created a deliberation council to exchange information among the firms and
the government, as well as to coordinate investment decisions. These polices
are believed to have contributed to the East Asian growth miracle.
I focus on the state’s lack of commitment as a main reason for underdevel-
opment. North and Weingast (1989) argue that for economic growth the state
must make a credible commitment as well as guarantee relevant rights for cit-
izens. The lack of commitment results from the coercive power of the state,
which allows the state to confiscate property from the citizens. The typical story
is that since citizens expect future expropriation or high taxes from the ruler,
they underinvest today, which leads to underdevelopment and undertaxation
(North and Weingast, 1989; Acemoglu, 2006).
The literature shows two types of solution to the commitment problem. The
first solution is to establish a reputation in a repeated game (Grossman and
2The regulation is reflected by the low level of competition and the impediment of market
transactions in the production market, the high market premium of exchange rates and the
low level of financial intermediation in the financial market.
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Noh, 1994; Acemoglu, 2006). If the players’ discount factors are suciently
high, cooperation is attainable. The problem of the reputation-based solution
is that the ruler’s position would be unstable, and so he would likely become
myopic.3 The second solution is to establish institutions, such as a parliament
or independent judiciary, which can restrict the ruler’s ability to renege (North
and Weingast, 1989).4 This approach, however, does not suciently answer
the question of how the state can commit to the institutions.
Instead of the above solutions, I use the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE)
and argue that economic growth can help a ruler make a credible commitment
to lower taxes. While imposing high taxes increase present taxation, it reduces
the capital stock in the next period. If the potential for economic growth is
high, it may be rational for the ruler to refrain from confiscation today to pro-
mote economic growth and then to expropriate the grown resources in the
future. This result could explain the East Asian scenario. One of the main
dierences between East Asian countries and sub-Saharan African countries
in 1960 was the education attainment (World Bank, 1993; Barro and Lee, 1993).
One interpretation of this is that an East Asian ruler who expected large eco-
nomic growth based on high education could restrain from confiscation and
commit to market-friendly policies for attaining economic growth. High edu-
cational attainment would increase economic growth, not only through high
productivity, but also by constraining the ruler’s predatory actions.
Other factors also help prevent predation from the ruler. In particular, two
of the eects of revolution are noteworthy. First, there is the high political
accountability eect, since a ruler engaged in expropriation are likely replaced,
3During the Cold War, the leaders of South Korea feared of attack by North Korea. In small
countries without natural resources, such as Singapore, which relies on Malaysia to provid
water, the leaders always worry about national survival.
4Also see Chapter 4 of this thesis.
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and so the ruler hesitates to impose a high tax.5 The key parameter for political
accountability is the cost of citizens joining the revolution. In a state with high
fractionalisation, the cost of revolution, such as with the successful coordina-
tion and management of an organization, would be considered to be high. The
high fractionalisation of sub-Saharan African countries would be an impedi-
ment to commitment and economic development. Second, if the probability
of replacement is high for any situation, the political instability eect becomes
a problem for commitment. With a high probability of replacement, a ruler
chooses present consumption over future consumption.
Furthermore, the model shows potential multiple equilibria due to coordi-
nation failure among the private sectors. With the case of multiple equilibria,
the ruler needs the cooperation of the citizens to attain the Pareto-superior equi-
librium. The deliberation councils created by the governments in South Korea
and Malaysia made coordination possible and lead to high-economic growth
equilibrium. High fractionalisation in African countries, however, might cause
coordination failure.
The chapter is related to the work on the “state capacity” to raise taxation.
Besley and Persson (2009) theoretically show that a high expected demand for
public spending, such as the potential of war, induces the ruler to invest in the
state capacity. Acemoglu (2005) presents a theoretical model to show that a
ruler who heavily discounts the future, or suers from a precarious tenure, will
fail in collecting taxation and increasing economic development. His results
are confirmed in this chapter.
In the literature there are studies on economic growth under autocracies
that explain growth dierence. Overland et al. (2005) discuss the relationship
5The eect of political accountability is complehensively studied in the democracy model
(Persson and Tabellini, 2002).
64
between capital accumulation and political revolution, and show that if the
current capital stock is higher than some threshold level, the autocrat will be
willing to promote economic growth. Shen (2007) shows that the autocrat may
promote economicdevelopment to increase current consumption, although this
implies earlier democratization. Oechslin (2010) studies whether an increase in
the exogenous government revenue increases growth-promoting government
spending.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, I will present a framework
of the model and the basic commitment problemwithout economic growth. In
section 3, it is shown how economic growth solves the commitment problem.
In section 4, the revolution constraint is introduced. Finally, the conclusion is
oered in section 5.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 The Framework
In an infinite horizon economy, time is discrete and indexed by t. There is
a representative citizen and a ruler. The representative agent has the utility
function of
Ut =
1X
j=0
 j ln ct+ j (3.1)
where ct+ j is the consumption at time t + j and  is the discount factor.
The agent can access two types of production technology, both of which
use capital as the only production factor and produce the same goods. One
is called the marketable section, and the production function is given by Aka;t,
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where ka;t is the amount of capital used in the section. The other, which is called
the non-marketable section, is denoted by Bkb;t, where kb;t is the capital in the
non-marketable section. I assume A > B, which means that the marketable
sector is more ecient at producing goods than the non-marketable section.
Let kt = ka;t+kb;t. For clear description, lett 2 [0; 1] denote the fraction of capital
used for the marketable sector, so that, given the available capital stock kt, the
capital stocks of each sector can be rewritten as ka;t = tkt and kb;t = (1   t)kt.
For simplicity, I assume no depreciation of capital.
The ruler imposes a tax rate t on the output at time t. The output from the
marketable section is fully taxed and a fraction  2 (0; 1) of the output from the
non-marketable section is taxable. Parameter  reflects the fact that in the non-
marketable sector tax avoidance would be possible. The ruler’s objective is not
to maximize social welfare, but to maximize the sum of the discounted present
value of the utility derived from consumption cr;t, which is supposed to be the
total amount of taxation at the same period, i.e. cr;t = tAtkt + tB(1   t)kt.
The ruler’s utility function is
Vt =
1X
j=0
 jr ln cr;t+ j; (3.2)
where r is the ruler’s discount factor, which is possibly dierent from the
agent’s discount factor . For simplicity, I ignore the productive role of the
ruler.6 Further, it canbe interpreted that someof the ruler’s consumptionwould
benefit the agent as public goods, such as national defense. Such an extension
does not change the following analysis if the agent’s utility from the public
spending is additively separable from the utility of the private consumption.
6The assumption of A being higher than B implies that the ruler provides the public goods
for production in the marketable sector. See Barro (1990) for the productive role of public
goods that the ruler provides for economic growth.
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The timing of events within every period is as follows:
1. Given capital stock kt, the agent makes investment decision t.
2. The ruler sets the tax rate t.
3. The agent produces goods and the ruler receives taxation.
4. The agent consumes some of the output, ct, and saves the rest as capital
stock for the next period, kt+1.
The assumption that the autocrat can set the tax rate after the agent chooses
the production technology implies that he has absolute authority in terms of
setting policy. In otherwords, even if the autocrat announces the tax rate before
the agent invests, he can renege on the announcement and impose a dierent
tax rate, and the commitment problem would be realised.
The Markov perfect equilibrium is used as a solution in this model. The
Markov strategies are functions only of the current payo-relevant state, kt, and
of prior actions within the same period. Furthermore, I focus on the stationary
MPE, such that the ruler’s decision on the tax rate is independent from the
current level of capital stock.
Although the ruler’s choice of the tax ratedependson the agent’s investment
decision, t, the agent is not supposed to internalize the eect when making a
decision on the production technology. The assumption is implied by the fact
that the ruler’s choice of tax depends on the “aggregate” levels of capital. Since
the size of each agent is infinitesimally small, it does not take the eect of the
decision into account.
67
3.2.2 Commitment ProblemWithout Economic Growth
This subsection discusses the simplemodelwithout capital accumulation. Sup-
pose that the capital stock is constant over time: kt = k for any t. Let fN; cN; Ng
be a profile of the MPE strategies of this game.
The MPE with constant capital stock are backwardly characterized as fol-
lows. First, the agent consumes all post-tax output, i.e. cN(t; t) = (1 t)Atk+
(1 t)B(1 t)k. Then, it is easily shown that the ruler optimally sets N(t) = 1
for any t 2 [0; 1]. Since the tax rate does not aect the capital stock in the next
period, the ruler will grab all resources available.
Finally, anticipating this tax rate, the agent does not invest in themarketable
section, i.e. N = 0. More specifically, the agent invests in the more productive
sector from the post-tax perspective, and then makes a decision based on the
following general rule:
N
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
= 1 if N(N) < ¯
2 [0; 1] if N(N) = ¯
= 0 if N(N) > ¯
(3.3)
where ¯ = (A   B)=(A   B) 2 (0; 1). Note that ¯ is the tax rate under which the
post-tax productivity is the same over the sectors. Thus, given the ruler’s MPE
strategy on the tax rate, the agent’s optimal response is to allocate all capital to
the non-marketable sector. The taxation that the ruler can collect in equilibrium
is Bk.
Now, consider a hypothetical situation in which the ruler can commit to the
tax rate, t = ¯. Then, since the agent invests only in the marketable section
every period, the taxation to the ruler is ¯Ak. Hence, the ruler would like to
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commit to a tax rate equal to ¯, which leads to ecient investment, if
¯A > B: (3.4)
Condition (3.4) holds when ratio A=B is high and/or  takes the extreme value,
which is suciently low or high. Under the high ratio of A=B, the ruler would
like to lead the agent to invest in the market sector.7 A low value of  means
that the ruler faces diculties in capturing the output in the non-marketable
sector. A high value of  leads to a high ¯ since the citizens are reluctant to
invest in the non-market sector. Although the eects create an incentive for
the ruler to commit to the low tax rate, the commitment is not be attainable in
MPE.
Proposition 3.1 summarises the results in this subsection.
Proposition 3.1. In MPE, the agent always uses the non-marketable section for any
k > 0 and the ruler sets the tax rate equal to 1. Further, the ruler suers from the
commitment problem if the ratio A=B is high and/or  is extremely low or high, all of
which derive inequality (3.4).
Proposition 3.1 shows a lack of commitment to the low tax rate, leading
to underinvestment. The importance of the commitment problem has been
comprehensively shown in the literature on the political economy of economic
development.8 Furthermore, the empirical literature has found positive cor-
relation between investments and property rights protection.9 Thus, it would
be a consensus that one of the key elements for economic development is to
7There also exists an indirect eect from an increase of A=B, which is an increase of the
threshold tax rate ¯, as the agent is more likely to invest in the marketable sector.
8See Acemoglu (2006) for a theoretical analysis and see North and Weingast (1989) for
historical research.
9See Knack and Keefer (1995) and Acemoglu et al. (2005) for a cross-country analysis and
Besley (1995) for a farmer-level analysis.
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credibly commit to property rights protection of private capital. Although the
significance of commitment is widely confirmed, it is not obvious how com-
mitment would be credibly made. While the proposed solutions for credible
commitment in the literature are reputation in a repeated game and institu-
tional development, in the next section it is shown that economic growth is
also a key for commitment.
Finally, to stress the importance of commitment in this economy, I assume
that inequality (3.4) always holds.
3.3 Markov Perfect Equilibrium with Economic
Growth
In this section, I characterize the MPE, in which the capital accumulation of the
agent aects the ruler’s decision on the tax. A key point is that the tax on the
output has the income eect on the agent’s consumption-saving choice. Let
fG; cG; kG; Gg denote a set of the MPE strategies for the players.
3.3.1 The Agent’s Decision
In the first stage of period t, the agent still follows investment rule (3.3), evalu-
ated at the MPE tax G(G; kt), since the agent would like to invest in the sector
with higher productivity.10
In the fourth stage, the agent makes a consumption-saving choice. Lemma
3.1 shows the consumption and saving functions given fkt; t; tg.
10Under the stationary MPE, the investment rule does not depend on the current capital
stock, since the ruler’s equilibrium decision on the tax rate is independent from it.
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Lemma 3.1. Given kt, t, t, the agent chooses consumption, cG(t; t; kt), and capital,
kG(t; t; kt), such that
cG(t; t; kt) = ((1   )=)[a(t)t + b(t)(1   t)]kt; (3.5)
kG(t; t; kt) = [a(t)t + b(t)(1   t)]kt; (3.6)
where a() = (1 + (1   )A) and b() = (1 + (1   )B). Hence, the growth rate
in this economy is denoted by a(t)t + b(t)(1   t).
Lemma 3.1 can be derived using the Euler equation, the budget constraint
and the transversality condition. Capital accumulation in this economy is
determined by equation (3.6), which implies that fraction  of the post-tax
output and the non-depreciated current capital stock is saved for the next-
period capital stock. An increase in , of course, reduces the next capital stock
because of the income eect.
3.3.2 Commitment Problem and Equilibrium
Although theMarkov strategy of the tax rate is a function of kt andt, I will only
characterize the action on the equilibrium path. If the ruler puts weight on the
future consumptions, then he has incentive to set the low tax rate to promote
economic growth. I will check whether this mechanism is self-enforcing in
MPE.
The ruler’s optimization problem is summarised by the following Bellman
equation:
VG(t; kt) = max
t2[0;1]
ln[t(tA + (1   t)B)kt] + rVG(Gt+1; kGt+1); (3.7)
s.t. kGt+1 = k
G(t; t; kt) and Gt+1 = 
G:
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Before solving the MPE policy, I consider a hypothetical situation where
the agent always chooses the same  for any available capital. From the Euler
equation and the stationary condition, such as the constant tax rate, the solution
of this hypothetical problem is ˆ() = minfˆI(); 1g, where ˆI() is the interior
solution of the above problem, such that
1
ˆI()
+
r
1   r 
0a(ˆI()) + 0b(ˆ
I())(1   )
a(ˆI()) + b(ˆI())(1   ) = 0: (3.8)
The first term of the equation (3.8) denotes an increase in the marginal utility
from the marginal increase in the tax rate. The second term shows a decrease
in the marginal utility from the decrease in the capital accumulation over the
future. If the eect of the first term is suciently low compared to that of
the second term, the ruler optimally sets a lower tax rate than 1. Lemma 3.2
summarises the discussion.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that the agent always chooses, t =  for any t. Then the ruler
sets tax rate ˆ() = minfˆI(); 1g, where
ˆI() =
(1   r)[1 + A + (1   )B]
A + (1   )B : (3.9)
Tax rate ˆI() satisfies that @ˆI=@ < 0, @ˆI=@r < 0, @ˆI=@A < ( = ) 0 if  2 (0; 1]
(a = 0) and @ˆI=@B R 0 if and only if  R =(1   )A.
Equation (3.9) can be derived as an explicit solution of equation (3.8). Notice
that an increase in  decreases ˆI(). The key point is that under high , the
negative eect of the tax rate on economic growth becomes large.
I can now characterize the MPE tax rate, G. At first, I will consider the case
of ˆI(1)  ¯. In this case, imposing the low tax rate ˆI(1) is self-enforcing if the
agent always chooses the marketable sector. In fact, the agent invests only in
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Figure 3.1: Unique growth equilibrium
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Figure 3.2: Multiple equilibria
the market sector if the ruler chooses ˆI(1).
Although ˆI(1) is the equilibrium tax rate, if ˆI(1) < ¯ < ˆI(0), there also
exists two inecient stationary equilibria due to coordination failure. The first
is that the agent chooses G, which satisfies ˆI(G) = ¯. Then, the ruler credibly
sets ¯. The second is more inecient, in that the agent invests all resources in
the non-marketable section and the ruler sets G = minfˆI(0); 1g. Notice that the
MPE of G = 1 and G = ˆI(1) is Pareto superior to the other equilibria. Since
the agent does not take into account the eect of the production choice on the
ruler’s decision, coordination failure occurs among agents.
In Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the ruler’s optimal tax in the hypothetical situation,
i.e. ˆ(), and the agent’s optimal investment rule given the ruler’s strategy,
i.e. equation (3.3), are denoted. Their intersections represent MPE. Figure 3.1
shows the unique high growthMPE inwhich a low tax and ecient investment
are realised. Figure 3.2 shows the multiple equilibria due to coordination
failure. Any points of E1, E2 and E3 are attainable in MPE.
Finally, only the inecient equilibrium exists when ˆI(1) > ¯. In this case,
the ruler sets G = minfˆI(0); 1g and the agent invests only in thenon-marketable
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section. Although the ruler would like to commit to tax rate ¯ to promote
production and economic growth, the ruler is tempted into imposing the higher
tax rate. Hence, in this case, economic growth does not become a commitment
device.
The key variable for a credible low tax is the elasticity of the growth rate on
the tax rate:  ˆI[0a(ˆI)+0b(ˆI)(1 )]=[a(ˆI)+b(ˆI)(1 )]. If the elasticity is
high, themarginal decrease in economic growth due to imposing the higher tax
becomes larger. Hence, this mechanism prevents the ruler from imposing the
high tax rate and stagnating the economy, since increasing the tax rate heavily
decreases the agent’s capital accumulation. Notice that, given the levels of
 and  2 (0; 1], the higher the value of A, the higher the elasticity.11 While
productivity A increases the growth rate, it has a large impact on the marginal
decrease in economic growth.
Furthermore, the ruler with the high discount factor could commit to a low
tax rate. Since he puts weight on future consumption, he has an incentive to
promote economic growth.
The following proposition summarises the discussion.
Proposition 3.2. There are three types of MPE dependent on parameters. (i) When
both productivities A and B are high and/or the ruler’s discount factor  is high
(satisfying ˆI(0) < ¯), there exists a unique high-growth equilibrium in which the
ruler can commit to a low tax rate ˆI(1) and the agent invests everything in the
marketable sector.
(ii)When productivity A is low and/or the ruler’s discount factor  is low (satisfying
¯ < ˆI(1)), there exists a unique low-growth equilibrium in which the ruler sets
minfˆI(0); 1g and the agent invests everything in the non-marketable section.
(iii) When productivity A is high but B is low (satisfying ˆI(1)  ¯  ˆI(0)),
11This result holdswhen capital depreciation or capital taxation are not one hundred percent.
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multiple equilibria exist due to the coordination problem. One is the high-growth
equilibrium, which is the same as in case (i). Another is the low-growth equilibrium,
which is the same as in case (ii). The last is the intermediate equilibrium, in which the
ruler sets ¯ and the agent invests in both sectors.
As the East Asian non-democratic countries could adopt and commit to the
market-friendly policies, their economic and political environments satisfied
the conditions for the high growth equilibrium in this model. The productivity
of the marketable sector would reflect many variables in the economy; for
example, the formal and informal institutions favoring economic transactions,
technology, education and so on. The relatively high educational attainment in
the East Asian countries in 1960, compared to the African countries, has been
observed. The results of the model suggest that educational attainment not
only contributes to economic development directly, but it also helps the ruler’s
commitment, which leads to the agent’s ecient investment.
Furthermore, in some East Asian countries, South Korea and Malaysia,
deliberation councilswere founded to allow communication among private firms
and governments. The councils were used to coordinate investment in specific
industries. Hence, even if the economic and political environments satisfied
the case of multiple equilibria, it could be said that the government obtained
cooperation from the private sectors and led the economy to the high-growth
equilibrium.
Explanation of the economic stagnation in African countries based on the
model would be more dicult. Despite disadvantages in the economic envi-
ronment, such as the landlocked region and the low level of educational attain-
ment, the per capita GDP in the African countries in 1960 was not so dierent
from that of the East Asian countries. In fact, the future of Africa’s economy
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was regarded optimistically (Easterly and Levine, 1997). If the economic and
political environment satisfied the conditions for the high growth equilibrium,
the story of coordination failure would be sensible for explaining stagnation.
The high level of fractionalisation among citizens in the sub-Saharan African
countries might make coordination dicult. If, instead, the environment fit-
ted the conditions of the low growth equilibrium, the non-democratic African
countrieswould not be able to attain high economic growth unless productivity
increased and/or the ruler emphasised for future consumption.
3.4 Political Replacement Eect
While the previous section focused on the ect of growth on the commitment
problem, one important constraint against the ruler’s discretion is the possi-
bility of a loss of political power. In this section, the ruler faces the revolution
constraint, where citizens can organize a rebel group to replace the ruler.12
I assume that after successful revolution, a new but identical ruler will take
oce.
The structure and the timing of the game are modified as follows. After
producing outputs and paying taxation, the agent makes a decision whether
to join a rebel group. Let Jt be an indicator function, such that it selects 1 if the
agent joins the group and 0 if otherwise. I assume that if the representative
agent joins the revolution, it can be successful with probability 1, while if not,
the ruler can keep his position.13
The benefit of joining the revolution is that after a successful revolution,
fraction 2 [0; 1] of the taxation the rulerpossesses is returned to thegroup. The
12The revolution constraint in this section follows Acemoglu (2005).
13The assumption of a successful revolution implies that there exists no externality among
the citizens.
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cost is that the agents loose fraction t 2 [0; ] of the current production, where
exogenous parameter  is assumed to be in [; 1]. Fraction t is determined
by the exogenous random variable, which is realised after taxation is corrected
and before the agents decide to join the group. Random variable t follows the
uniform distribution over [0; ]. Parameter  may reflect the severity of the
organisational problem inside the revolutionary group.
Furthermore, I assume that after successful revolution at time t, the replaced
ruler obtains the continuous value W(kt). For obtaining consistent results, I
parameterize the function, such that
W(kt) = 11   r ln kt + ';
where ' reflects the life process of the ruler after being replaced.14 If the citizen
does not amount an insurrection, the ruler consumes all taxation collected in
the period. The model implicitly assumes that the ruler does not save for a
replacement when he is in oce. The assumption is justified by the fact that,
after the successful revolution, the ruler might be killed or confined.15 Thus,
the saving might be in vain.
To make the analysis plausible, the value of ' is bounded above, such that
in equilibrium the ruler would not like to resign his position. Specifically, I
14Suppose that, after the revolution, the ruler chooses the consumption plan given the
lifetime income  kt. Then,
W(kt) = max
fcr;t+ jg1j=0:
P1
j=0 cr;t+ j= kt

1X
j=0
 jr ln cr;t+ j
=
1
1   r ln kt +
1
1   r
 
ln(1   r) + r1   r ln r
!
:
Thus, ' is (ln(1   r) )=(1   r) + r(ln r)=(1   r)2.
15A low value of ' may reflect the fact that the ruler would be killed or confined after the
successful revolution. A high value means that the ruler can defect to some foreign country
with a huge amount of assets.
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assume that
' <
1
1   r
"
lnB +
r
1   r lnb(1)
#
: (A1)
To interpret the above inequality, consider an example where the agent always
invests in the non-marketable section and the ruler imposes a tax rate equal
to 1. Inequality (A1) implies that, facing this situation, the ruler would like to
keep his position rather than resign and enjoyW.
Let fR; R; JR; cR; kRg be the MPE strategies for the game with the revolution
constraint. Furthermore, as in the previous section, I focus on the stationary
MPE, such that the agent’s decision on the production sector and the ruler’s
decision on the tax rate are independent from the current level of total capital
stocks kt.
Now consider the agent’s decision regarding revolution. The decision to
join the rebel group depends on the net benefits for the revolution, which is
d(t; t; t) = [tAt + tB(1   t)]kt   t[At + B(1   t)]kt. For simplicity, let
¯(t; t) = [At + B(1   t)]t=[At + B(1   t)]. Notice that the condition of
d(t; t; t)  0 is the same as that of t  ¯(t; t). Hence, the agent’s decision
to join the revolution can now be written as
JR(t; t; kt; t) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1 if d(t; t; t)  0 (or t  ¯(t; t))
0 if d(t; t; t) < 0 (or t > ¯(t; t)).
(3.10)
Notice that ¯(; ) is less than  for any  2 [0; 1] and any  2 [0; 1]. Thus,
the probability that the ruler retains political power is (t; t) = 1   Prft 
¯(t; t)g = 1   ¯(t; t)=, which decreases in t and t, i.e. @(; )=@ < 0
and @(; )=@ < 0. Intuitively, the high level of  attracts the agents to join
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the revolution since it makes the revolution profitable to the agents. The high
level of  has two dierent eects upon joining the revolution. The positive
eect arises from the fact that it makes the total taxation larger, given the tax
rate. The negative eect is derived from the increase in the cost of joining the
revolution. It can be shown that the first eect always dominates the second.16
Furthermore, notice that the probability of retaining oce decreases in  and
increases in . Low  and high  represent the low net benefits of the citizens
in a revolution.
As in the last section, the agent’s investment decision is given by equation
(3.3). The agent’s consumption-saving decision now depends on the cost-and-
benefit of the revolution. The log-utility function still assures that the fraction
 of the disposable income is saved.
Lemma 3.3. Consider the model with revolution. Given kt, t, t, t and Jt, the repre-
sentative agent chooses consumption, cR(t; t; Jt; kt; t), and capital, kR(t; t; Jt; kt; t)
as follows.
cR(t; t; Jt; kt; t) = ((1   )=)[a(t)t + b(1   t) + Jtd(t; t; t)]kt;
(3.11)
kR(t; t; Jt; kt; t) = [a(t)t + b(t)(1   t) + Jtd(t; t; t)]kt: (3.12)
If the agent challenged the ruler and received net benefits d(t; t; t)kt, then
the agent saves fraction  of it. Since the positive benefits from the revolution
are a bonus for the agent, both consumption and savings increase as an income
eect.
Now, consider the choice of the ruler who faces the revolution constraint.
16Notice that it holds that @2(; )=@2 = 0 and @2(; )=@@ < 0.
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Given kt and t, the Bellman equation of the ruler is now as follows:
VR(t; kt)
= max
t2[0;1]
(t; t)E[ln(t(tA + (1   t)B)kt) + rVR(Rt+1; kRt+1)jt  ¯]
+ (1   (t; t))W(kt); (3.13)
s.t. JRt = J
R(t; t; kt; t); kRt+1 = k
R(t; t; JRt ; kt; t) and 
R
t+1 = 
R:
Notice that keeping the position provides two kinds of benefits to the ruler.
One is the current consumption. If in oce, the ruler can consume all taxation.
The other is the future consumption. Only when the ruler keeps his position
can he enjoy economic growth.
Since I focus on the stationary equilibrium, consider, as in section 3.3.2, the
hypothetical case where the agent always invests fraction  of the capital stock
to the marketable section. Let ˜() = minf˜I(); 1g denote the ruler’s optimal
decision in this hypothetical case, where ˜I() is the interior solution. Following
the Euler equation and the stationary condition, the interior solution ˜I() is
determined by the following:17
(˜I(); )
"
1
˜I()
+
r
1   r 
0a(˜I()) + 0b(˜
I())(1   )
a(˜I()) + b(˜I())(1   )
#
+
(˜I(); )
1   r(˜I(); )
8>>>><>>>>:
ln ˜I()(A + B(1   ))   (1   r)'
+
r
1 r ln[a(˜
I()) + b(˜I())(1   )]
9>>>>=>>>>; = 0 (3.14)
Three eects of political replacement are noteworthy. First, note that the
first term of equation (3.14) represents the same eect in equation (3.8). The
first term in the bracket shows the marginal increase of utility derived from the
17The derivation is shown in the Appendix.
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marginal increase of the tax rate. The second term in the bracket reflects the
growth eect, which decreases the equilibrium tax rate. The only dierence is
that both eects are weighted by the probability of keeping oce, (˜I(); ).
Only if the ruler keeps his position can he receive the taxation and the benefits
of economic growth.
Second, the elasticity of keeping oce, with respect to the tax rate, is shown
in the weight of the second term of equation (3.14) after a simple calculation,
i.e.  ˜I()(˜I(); )=(˜I(); ), and denotes the marginal eect of political
replacement. The ruler who tries to marginally increase the tax rate faces the
increased probability of the successful revolution. If the ruler cannot keep
his position in the period, he loses the taxation and the benefits of economic
growth shown by the bracket in the second term. Hence, I call this marginal
replacement eect the political accountability eect. A high political account-
ability eect leads to a low tax rate if the value of ' is low enough to satisfy
condition (A1).18 Since parameter ' represents the utility of the ruler when he
is replaced, the ruler facing a low 'would like to retain oce and then impose
a lower tax rate.
Finally, the denominators of the weight in the second term, 1 r(˜I(); )),
show thepolitical stability eect. Highpolitical instability, which is represented
by a low (˜I(); ), makes it dicult fot the ruler to commit to a low tax rate.
The result is intuitive, since the ruler facing a sever revolution constraint likely
grabs many resources while in oce.
Note thatparameters and aect bothpolitical accountability andpolitical
stability. Since the low level of  and the high level of motivate the citizens to
join the revolutionwhen the ruler sets a high tax rate, thepolitical accountability
18Under the MPE values of investment decision R and tax rate R, the value of ' satisfies,
such that the bracket of the third term is positive.
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eect increases. However, low  and high  lead to political instability. A ruler
who faces a high probability of successful revolution tries to extract a large
amount of output, so as to enjoy the position. Although the political instability
eect weakens the political accountability eect, the net eect is positive for
committing to a low tax.
Similar to the equilibrium in the last section, three types of MPE exist. The
values in the conditions of each equilibrium are replaced by ˜I(1) and ˜I(0) from
ˆI(1) and ˆI(0), respectively. Since the replacement eect decreases tax rate ˜(),
the high-growth MPE would be more likely to be attainable, compared to the
last section.19
The following proposition summarises the discussion.
Proposition 3.3. In the model with political replacement, there exists three types
of equilibria, all of which have similar characteristics in Proposition 3.2. Political
replacement contributes to a credible commitment to a low tax rate ˜I(1), which is
amplified by low , high  and low '.
The literature on the empirics of economic growth shows a positive corre-
lation between the institution variables, e.g. property rights protection, and
economic variables, e.g. economic growth. The institution variables would re-
flect the political accountability eect. The mechanism behind the correlation,
proposed by this chapter, is that the high performance of political institutions
helps the ruler commit to a low tax rate, and then the low tax rate allows the
citizens to invest eciently and leads to high economic growth.20 As an in-
stitutional variable, the low value of ' shows the ruler’s constraint from the
successful revolution. If the revolution does not politically punish the current
19Actually, it holds that ˜()  ˆ().
20The inverse causality may exist, which this chapter does not deal with, such that the high
economic growth leads to the institutional change, i.e. democratization. See Shen (2007).
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ruler, he would like to enjoy his discretionary power and cannot credibly com-
mit to a low tax. Indeed, the rulers in East Asian countries needed economic
success to obtain political legitimacy (World Bank, 1993). Furthermore, con-
sistent with the results of the theoretical model, the empirical literature also
shows a negative correlation between political instability and economic growth
(Alesina et al., 1996; Devereux and Wen, 1998).
The characteristics of MPE have another implication. The value of , which
represents a diculty in organizing a revolutionmay be regarded as the level of
fractionalisation or segregation in the population. Collier and Hoeer (2004)
empirically show that the level of fractionalisationdecreases the risk of civilwar
and they interpret as the citizens under high fractionalisation face a diculty in
organizing the rebel group.21 The model proposes that the relatively high level
of fractionalisation of the sub-Saharan African countries would be due to the
lack of political accountability, i.e. the barrier to the ruler’s commitment and
to economic growth.22 The empirical literature shows a negative correlation
between fractionalisation and quality of government (Easterly and Levine,
1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 2003).
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I developed amodel that explains the relationship between eco-
nomic growth and an autocratic ruler’s commitment problem. Without capital
accumulation, the ruler is always tempted to impose a high tax rate in MPE,
21Collier and Hoeer (2002) argue that the incidence of civil war in sub-Saharan African
countries is due to poor economic performance, which is partially canceled out by high social
fractionalisation.
22Although in the last section I discussed how fractionalisation may lead to a serious co-
ordination problem among citizens, the value of  in this section directly aects the ruler’s
commitment problem.
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which leads to underdevelopment. With capital accumulation, the tax rate af-
fects the future capital stock through the income eect. Then, when the impact
of the tax rate on economic growth is large and/or the ruler’s discount factor is
high, the ruler has an incentive to impose a low tax rate, which implies that the
ruler can make a credible commitment. The high elasticity of the growth rate
with respect to the tax rate is achieved by high productivity in the marketable
section. High productivity can be interpreted as the high level of education
in East Asian countries. Hence, East Asian countries would be considered to
have apotential advantage for political commitment and for attaining economic
growth. Furthermore, the model shows the possibility of multiple equilibria.
The deliberation councils established by some East Asian rulers can help with
coordination among the private sectors and the government, leading to the
economy to high-growth equilibrium.
Another result is to show that political replacement has two dierent eects
on the commitment problem. First, if the ruler can be replaced when he adopts
a bad policy, the ruler who takes into account the future consumption needs
to maintain high economic growth (political accountability eect). Second, if
the ruler can be easily replaced for any policy, the ruler will be reluctant to
promote economic growth (political instability eect). Thus, political account-
ability helps the ruler to commit to a low tax rate, while political instability
leads to a more severe commitment problem. The model shows that the polit-
ical accountability eect dominates the political instability eect, and political
replacement contributes to the ruler’s commitment. One of the key elements
to make political accountability work is to reduce the cost of revolution. The
high level of fractionalisation in sub-Saharan African countries may prevent
their governments from being accountable, since the high fractionalisation im-
plies diculties in organising rebel groups, which leads to the high cost of
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revolution.
3.6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Note that the agent’s budget constraint is
kt+1 + ct = (1   t)Atkt + (1   t)B(1   t)kt + kt:
Given fkt; t; tg, the Euler equation is shown by
  1
cGt
+ 
(1   Gt+1)AGt+1 + (1   Gt+1)B(1   Gt+1) + 1
cGt+1
= 0:
Functions (3.5) and (3.6) satisfy the Euler equation and the budget constraint.
Furthermore, they also satisfy the usual transversality condition.
Proof of Lemma 3.3
A similar proof to Lemma 3.1 can be applied. The agent’s budget constraint is
now
kt+1 + ct = (1   t)Atkt + (1   t)B(1   t)kt + Jtd(t; t; t)kt:
Then, the Euler equation is shown by
  1
cRt
+Et+1
1
cRt+1
[(1 Rt+1)ARt+1+(1 Rt+1)B(1 Rt+1)+ JRt+1d(Rt+1; Rt+1; t+1)] = 0:
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Equations (3.11) and (3.12) satisfy the FOC, the budget constraint and the
transversality condition.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Assume that t is always constant for any period t. Furthermore, let (; ) =
a() + b()(1   ). Then, the ruler’s problem can be written as
V˜(; kt) = max

(; )[ln (A+ (1 )B)kt+rV˜(; kt+1)]+ (1 (; ))W(kt)
(3.15)
subject to kt+1 = (; )kt. Furthermore, let
h(; ) = (; )[ln (A + (1   )B)kt + rV˜(; kt+1)] + (1   (; ))W(kt):
I will prove proposition 3.3 step-by-step.
Step 1: Derive the value function using the guess-and-verify method. I guess
that V˜(; k) = x ln k + y. Then, equation (3.15) is
x ln kt + y = (˜(); )[ln ˜()(A + (1   )B)kt + r(x ln(˜(); )kt + y)]
+ (1   (˜(); ))W(kt):
Hence, it holds that
x =
1
1   r ;
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and
y = (˜();)1 r(˜();)
h
ln ˜()(A + B(1   )) + r1 r ln(˜(); ) +
(1 (˜();))'
(˜();)
i
:
Step 2: Derive equation (3.14). It is derived using the first-order condition,
h(˜I; ) = 0 and the stationary condition.
Step 3: Check the second order condition and the uniqueness of ˜I() and
˜I() < ˆI(), if any. Let  2 (0; ˆI()) be such that ln (A + B(1   )) +
r[ln(; )]=(1   r)   (1   r)' = 0. Note that from assumption (A1),  is
uniquely determined and ln (A+B(1 ))+r[ln(; )]=(1 r) (1 r)' R 0
if and only if  R .
At first, it can be shown that in regions [0; ) and (ˆ
I(); 1], there exists no
solution satisfying the first order condition.
Now, consider region [; ˆ
I()]. Because of the fact that h is continuous in
, h(; ) > 0 and h(ˆ
I(); ) < 0, there exists at least one tax rate satisfying
h(; ) = 0 in the region. It can be shown that, for any ˜I(), it holds that
h(˜I(); ) < 0. This result means that ˜I() is unique, since function h is
dierentiable in [; ˆ
I()].
Finally, the above discussion assures the uniqueness of ˜() and ˜I() 
ˆI().
Step 4: Show the sign of @˜I()=@. It can be shown that h(˜I; ) < 0, at least
if ˜I()  ¯. Then, in this case, it holds that
@˜I()
@
=  h(˜
I(); )
h(˜I(); )
< 0:
Step 5: Show three types of equilibria. Since ˜I() is decreasing in , at least if
˜I()  ¯, function ˜() crosses through ¯ only once, if at all. Hence, the same
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reasoning as in Proposition 3.2 can be applied to prove the MPE.
Step 6: Show @˜I=@ > 0, @˜I=@ < 0 and @˜I=@' > 0. It can be shown that
h(˜I; ) > 0, h(˜I; ) < 0 and h(˜I; ) > 0. Thus, the above inequalities hold.
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Chapter 4
Rights and Judicial Independence
4.1 Introduction
Why do some rulers establish and support political institutions, such as legis-
latures and judiciaries, which constrains their behaviour, while others do not?
Why do some rulers protect property rights and human rights, even if it is
costly? The answers to these questions are especially important since the lit-
erature shows a positive relationship between the quality of institutions or the
protection of rights and economic development (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Rodrik
et al., 2004; Sen, 1999; Blume andVoigt, 2007). Figuring out a ruler’s incentive to
establish institutions is a key to shedding light on the mechanism of economic
development.
This chapter focuses on a lack of commitment inherent in political power,
which the literature on transaction-cost politics underlines as an obstacle to eco-
nomic development (North, 1990; Dixit, 1996; Acemoglu, 2003). Even though
the ruler announces protection of private property rights, he has no limita-
tions on reneging on it. The abuse of political power to ignore property rights
prevents citizens, who anticipate the ruler’s violation of his announcement,
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from investing in an ecient way, although investment brings benefit to both
citizens and the ruler. Hence, with a constant lack of commitment, the ruler
cannot collect sucient taxes, a part of which are used for productive public
expenditures. This ineciency hampers economic development.
Research in economic history shows not only the existence of this commit-
ment problem, but also a possible solution. In a seminal paper, North and
Weingast (1989) argue that, in 17th-century England, the government under
the Stuarts’ reign could not borrow enough money to cover war costs due to
their inability to honor contractual agreements. After the Glorious Revolution
of 1688, the development of institutions, which was an advanced role of Par-
liament and the independent judiciary, enabled the government to keep their
credible commitments.
After the Cold War, a number of competitive authoritarian governments
came into the world (Levitsky and Way, 2002). A competitive authoritarian
regime is defined as one in which the ruler relies on democratic rules to obtain
and exercise political authority, but often violates or manipulates them. Al-
though the competitive authoritarian government would make an attempt to
influence judicial decisions, an independent judiciary contributes to the ability
of the government to commit to the rule of law. For the purpose of the states’
survival, the Asian authoritarian regimes, the Kuomintang of China in Taiwan
and the People’s Action Party in Singapore, established institutions that in-
cluded high-quality courts. The judiciaries in these countries promote foreign
investment and enhance financial credibility in the regimes, which are crucial
for such small states to survive (Root and May, 2008; Silverstein, 2008).
Checks and balances by an independent judiciary can protect property
rights from the state’s expropriation. Judicial independence (JI) plays a vital
role in law enforcement without interference from the executive branch or
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the legislature. Judges with the security of tenure can undertake constitutional
review independent of the ruler, even if judges’ decisions are against the ruler’s
will. Judges with JI can decide cases according to the rule of law even if their
decisions are against the ruler’s will.1
An independent judiciary is necessary for credibility, but is not sucient.
The establishment of JI causes another commitment problem: Can the gov-
ernment commit to keep the judiciary independent? A government strong
enough to create institutions is also strong enough to abolish the institutions to
renege on a promise of property rights protection. Therefore, the independent
judiciary must be credible in order to become the fundamental solution to the
commitment problem.
Related to the above issue, transmission from ruler to citizens of information
about the judiciary plays a key role in the credibility of commitment. Unless
receiving information, citizens would doubt the eectiveness of JI. Although
not presenting a theoretical model, Farber (2002) argues that, by protecting
human rights, the ruler can send a signal that he limits his power to confiscate
private property. Because of the complementarity between the independent
judiciary and human rights protection, the signal can be eective.
To wrestle with these issues, I develop a political commitment game be-
tween a self-interested ruler and citizens. The game allows an independent
judiciary as an endogenous commitment technology associated with endoge-
nous reneging costs (Lohmann, 1992; Perino, 2010). In the game, the ruler
creates the endogenous level of JI with proportional cost and announces the
tax rate. After citizens produce output, which involves costly eort, the ruler
has the opportunity to renege on the announced tax rate. If the ruler tries to
1Although formal JI entitles judges to exercise judicial review, a fear of overrule by the ruler
may prevent judges from asserting their authority. A key to credible commitment is de facto
JI.
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renege, he must pay the reneging cost, which is positively proportional to the
level of JI. I assume the exogenous information transmission such that, with
some positive probability, citizens have perfect information on JI and, with the
remaining probability, citizens are not aware of it.
This chapter has two main contributions. I show that, in equilibrium with
the positive probability of information transmission, the ruler creates a positive
level of JI and can commit to the announced tax rate. The equilibrium tax rate,
however, is on the inecient side of the Laer curve. The ineciently high tax
arises from the diculty of honouring property rights. Reduction in the tax
rate has two eects; one is an increase in production and taxation, and the other
is the additional cost to increase the level of JI for credible commitment, since
an increase in production tempts the ruler to renege on the announcement. The
ruler’s ability to commit to the low tax rate increaseswith the cost of overruling
judicial decisions and the probability of successful information transmission,
while decreasing with the cost of creating JI.
Second, I analytically argue the positive role of human rights under the
commitment problem. Even though citizens never observe the degree of JI, the
ruler guarantees human rights as a signal of JI if the cost of human rights is
low. Citizens who observe the credible signal produce the outputs, since they
believe the ruler abides by his announcement. The crucial assumption for this
result is that a high level of JI makes it less costly to guarantee human rights
(the single crossing property). In this equilibrium, however, in addition to the
inecient tax rate, another source of ineciency arises. Since the ruler needs
to protect a positive level of costly human rights for credible commitment, the
ruler who would like to acquire cost reduction in human rights establishes
an ineciently high level of JI, in the sense that the ruler does not fully use
JI for lowering tax rates. Despite two types of ineciency, the creation of an
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independent judiciary achieves a Pareto improvement compared with the case
of lack of commitment, since citizens enjoy property rights protection and the
ruler can collect taxes.
The literature suggests a type of trigger strategy as the solution to a commit-
ment problem concerning property rights protection (Greif et al., 1994; Gross-
man and Noh, 1994; Weingast, 1995; Acemoglu, 2003, 2006). A crucial assump-
tion for maintaining a cooperative equilibrium is coordination among citizens
to punish the ruler who deviates from cooperation. If citizens cannot coordi-
nate, they have no ability to constrain the ruler’s exploitative actions. Myerson
(2008) shows that courts are a communication tool that improves the ability
of supporters to punish a ruler who reneges on announcements, and thus the
ruler benefits fromhaving courts as evidence of credible commitment. Further-
more, Stephenson (2003) and Carrubba (2005) argue that courts’ judgments are
a public signal that helps the political party to punish rivals who deviate from
mutual restraint to employ a moderate policy.
The literature proposes various explanations for why incumbent rulers
found independent judiciaries. Moustafa (2007) discusses five functions of
courts in authoritarian regimes. The ruler uses courts to (1) exercise social
control, (2) obtain legitimacy of the government, (3) control administrative
agents, (4) make a credible commitment to a market economy, and (5) delegate
controversial reforms to the judiciary. Maskin and Tirole (2004) show that,
in democratic countries, delegation to nonaccountable judges is beneficial if
oce-motivated politicians have strong incentive to pander to public opinion
for re-election. A noteworthy explanation of the ruler’s incentive to establish a
judiciary centres on the strategic relationship with the future government. An
independent judiciary would make it costly for the future government to alter
the currently adopted policies. Thus, if the current government anticipates
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regime change and has a dierent policy-preference from the future govern-
ment, the current government depends on the independent judiciary to make
the present policy durable (Landes and Posner, 1975; Hanssen, 2004).
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 describes the simple game of
a commitment problem under exogenous information transmission. Section
4.3 analyses human rights as a signal. Section 4.4 discusses the theoretical
implications of this model and their empirical validity. Section 4.5 concludes.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
4.2 The model of judicial independence
Consider a simple economy in which a unit measure of identical citizens pro-
duces consumption goods and a ruling elite levies a tax on the produced goods.
Citizens exert costly eort, e, to produce consumption goods, the amount of
which is the same as the exerted eort. Cost of eort is e2.2 Before production
starts, the ruler announces the tax rate, t 2 [0; 1], but, after production com-
pletes, he can change it to a dierent rate,  2 [0; 1].3 The level of  represents
the degree of violating property rights protection. Each citizen receives payo
(1   )e   e2, and the ruler’s payo is shown later.
Before introducing the independent judiciary as a commitment device, I
analyse two extreme cases: full commitment and lack of commitment. In
both cases, the ruler simply maximises the taxation. At first, consider the full
commitment case, in which the ruler always follows the announcement, i.e.,
2The following analysis and results qualitatively do not change under general cost function
c(e) that satisfies c(0) = 0, c0(0) = 0, and for any positive eorts c0() > 0, c00() > 0, and
 ec000(e)=c00(e) < 2. The quadratic cost function, e2, satisfies all the assumptions.
3The result of this chapter does not change in extensions such that the ruler can impose a tax
rate higher than 1 and/or impose also the other tax that is fixed and unrelated to production,
e.g., a poll tax.
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t = . In this case, citizens choose their eort of eC(t) = (1 t)=2. Then, the ruler
sets the tax rate at the top of the Laer curve, i.e., tC = argmaxt teC(t) = 1=2.
Next, suppose that the ruler freely reneges on the announcement. In the
extensive game, the ruler finally imposes N = 1 for any history of the game.
Then, citizens who anticipate this ruler’s behaviour choose eort of eN = 0,
no matter what tax rate the ruler announced. In this one-period game, since
the ruler does not guarantee property rights without any commitment devices,
citizens do not produce consumption goods at all, and then the ruler cannot
collect taxes.4
4.2.1 The independent judiciary as a commitment device
To solve the commitment problem, the ruler creates an independent judiciary.
The objective is to restrict the ruler’s ex-post discretion. However, a problem
still arises: How can the ruler commit to the independent judiciary? The ruler,
who has the power to establish institutions, can subordinate the independent
judiciary afterward. Hence, the independent judiciary must be self-enforcing
in equilibrium.
The ruler, at first, sets the non-negative level of JI, F. A high level of F implies
that the judiciary is fully independent from administration and legislation and
has authority, i.e., the judges are hired based on the merit system rather than
the ruler’s appointment and are tenured, and the judiciary has been authorised
for constitutional reviews.5
The level of JI is positively related with the cost to the ruler when he over-
4In a repeated setting of this game, if citizens can coordinate with each other and the
players’ discount rates are suciently high, then the ruler can commit to the low tax rate. This
is because citizens use trigger strategy such that, when the ruler reneges on the announcement,
citizens do not produce at all in some periods.
5Although it is important, and is usual in political science, to consider independence and
authority of judiciary distinctly, I assume that both factors contribute to high F.
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rules the judiciary and reneges on the announcement. I assume that the cost
is F, where  is a positive parameter.6 Overruling judicial decisions is costly
to the ruler in terms of both domestic and international legitimacy (Levitsky
and Way, 2002). The ruler’s subordination of the judiciary can cause political
challenge by his opponents, especially in the case of fragmented politics such
that preferences and powers are divergent inside the government, or such that
opposition parties have a strong political power for regime change (Ginsburg,
2003; Cha´vez et al., 2011). In 17th-century England, a ruler who observed the
Glorious Revolution feared that another revolution would occur if he reneged
on his commitment (North and Weingast, 1989). Furthermore, even though
facing risk of punishment by the ruler, judges who have strong motivation to
enforce the rule of law, or who attract public support for JI, can nullify the
ruler’s unconstitutional decisions (Vanberg, 2005; Staton, 2006; Hilbink, 2012).
The ruler’s abuse of his absolute power also causes international criticism. For
many countries, especially small countries that dependheavily on international
economic transactions, international reputation is essential for the survival of
the regime (Silverstein, 2008). Parameter  reflects these social factors against
the ruler.7 The ruler under fragile legitimacy after violating JI faces a high value
of . Although JI would be eective in market transactions, I assume that JI is
irrelevant to market productivity.
Furthermore, following Perino (2010), I assume that the ruler needs to pay
cost F to create the level of JI, F, where  is a positive parameter.8 The cost
6The assumption implies that the ruler needs to pay the same penalty regardless of the
direction of deviation. However, the results of thismodel does not changeunder an assumption
that the ruler incurs a cost only when he imposes a higher tax rate than announced.
7While F represents the independence of a judiciary, F shows the “eectiveness” of the
independence judiciary.
8In some countries, parameter  can be negative, which implies that, by establishing JI, the
ruler domestically and/or internationally gains political and monetary support that outweigh
the cost of creating JI. Then, the ruler establishes JI as high as he can, and imposes tax tC.
However, I assume that the benefit from founding JI does not outweigh the cost.
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proportional to F shows loss of the ruler’s power in various situations. For
example, a ruler with a high value of JI faces diculty in persecuting political
opponents. Parameter  also represents social and institutional factors against
the ruler. For instance, democratic rules and institutions help lower the cost,
i.e., result in a lower value of .9 In competitive authoritarian states that rely
on elections for the legitimacy of the regime, the current incumbent already
faces some restraint on political power to hold favourable elections. Thus, an
independent judiciary in competitive authoritarian states makes a relatively
small contribution to a fair election, compared to fully authoritarian countries
Important points of the commitment device are the degree of information
transmission about JI and citizens’ beliefs about JI. If citizens do not receive
information on JI and underestimate it, the independent judiciary cannot func-
tion perfectly as a commitment device. To analyse this potential information
problem, I introduce a stochastic state which takes either o or u. At state o,
citizens can observe the level of JI, while at state u, F is unobservable. The
probability that state o is realised is denoted by p, which is interpreted as the
quality of media and/or citizens’ education level in this economy. Suppose,
further, that the ruler does not know whether citizens observe the level of JI,
when he announces the tax rate.10 Then, the ruler’s payo is
R(F; t; ; eo; eu) = peo + (1   p)eu   It,F   F;
where eo, (eu), is citizens’ eort when the state is o, (u), and It, denotes the
indicator function, which equals 1 when t ,  and 0 when t = .
The timing of the game is the following:
9See Helmke and Rosenbluth (2009) for the relationship between democracy and indepen-
dent judiciary.
10Whether citizens have information on the state does not matter for the ruler when he
imposes tax .
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1. The ruler sets the level of JI, F, and pays the setting cost, F.
2. The ruler announces the tax rate, t.
3. Nature determines the state from fo;ugwith exogenous probability.
4. Citizens choose eort e, with or without information about JI.
5. The ruler sets the tax rate, . If he changes the tax rate, that is,  , t, he
pays the cost, F.
Let fFJp; tJp; Jp; eJo;p; eJu;pg denote a set of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)
strategies of this game. As in the usual imperfect information game, the game
hasmultiple equilibriadependent on citizens’ beliefs. I focuson the equilibrium
such that the ruler’s expected payo is maximised.11 I will characterise a set of
possible PBE in the footnotes.
Before directly characterising PBE of this game, I will analyse an extreme
case of full information transmission, corresponding to p = 1. This example
clarifies the role of an independent judiciary.
4.2.2 A case of full information transmission: p = 1
In this extreme case, citizens can observe the exact level of JI. Since full infor-
mation transmission implies that citizens can completely oversee the ruler’s
actions, the equilibrium production is the highest in any value of p.
The equilibrium is solved by simple backward induction. At the last stage,
the ruler reneges on his announcement and sets the tax rate equal to 1 if the
additional taxation, (1   t)e, is greater than the cost for change, F. Hence, the
11This focus is reasonable since the first mover is the ruler, who has an incentive to inform
the citizens about JI in any PBE.
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ruler sets a tax rate such as
J1(F; t; e) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
t if e < e¯(F; t);
t or 1 if e = e¯(F; t);
1 if e > e¯(F; t);
(4.1)
where e¯(F; t) = F=(1   t). When e = e¯(F; t), the ruler is indierent between
committing to announced tax t and violating it to impose tax rate 1. For the
existence of equilibrium in any sub-game, I define a behavioural strategy, r,
such that the ruler sets tax rate 1 with probability r and sets twith 1  r.12 Then,
strategy (4.1) can be rewritten as
rJ1(F; t; e)
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
= 0 if e < e¯(F; t);
2 [0; 1] if e = e¯(F; t);
= 1 if e > e¯(F; t):
(4.2)
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) show that citizens’ high eort tempts the ruler to
abolish the independent judiciary and renege on the announcement. I use J
and rJ interchangeably.
At the fourth stage, given F, t and equation (4.2), each citizen chooses eort
to maximise her payo. Notice that the level of eort in equation (4.2) is an
aggregate level, and then, each citizen does not take into account the eect of
her action on the ruler’s decision at the final stage. In equilibrium, each citizen
chooses eort as
eJo;1(F; t) = argmaxe
h
1   rJ1(F; t; eJo;1)
i
(1   t)e   e2: (4.3)
12The other types of behavioural strategies are at least weakly dominated by a behavioural
strategy belonging to the above class.
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Given F and t, a system of equations (4.2) and (4.3) determines the equilib-
rium levels of eorts and taxes, shown by the next lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Given F and t, the equilibrium strategy of eorts is
eJo;1(F; t) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
eC(t) if eC(t)  e¯(F; t),
e¯(F; t) if otherwise.
(4.4)
Given F, t and eJo;1(F; t), the equilibrium behavioural strategy of taxes is
rJ1(F; t; e
J
o;1(F; t)) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if eC(t)  e¯(F; t),
1   2F=(1   t)2 if otherwise.
(4.5)
Equation (4.4) shows that exerted eort is lower than or equal to e¯ so that, on
the equilibrium path, the ruler cannot strictly increase his payo by reneging
on the announcement. Notice that the threshold level of eort, e¯, is increasing
with the ruler’s total cost of abolishing JI, F. Thus, if the ruler established
the higher level of JI at the second stage, citizens could exert more eort when
e¯(F; t) < eC(t).
Finally, consider the ruler’s choice in the first and second stages. Let
Rˆ(F; t; r; eo) denote the ruler’s payo under the behavioural strategy r so that
Rˆ(F; t; rJ1; eJo;1) = [1 rJ1(F; t; eJo;1(F; t))]teJo;1(F; t)+rJ1(F; t; eJo;1(F; t))(eJo;1(F; t) F) F:
Given (4.4) and (4.5), the ruler chooses F and t to maximise Rˆ(F; t; rJ1; eJo;1).
The next lemma makes it simple to characterise the equilibrium JI and
announced tax.
Lemma 4.2. In equilibrium, eJo;1(F
J
1; t
J
1) = e
C(tJ1) = e¯(F
J
1; t
J
1).
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Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 show that, on the equilibrium path, the ruler does
not renege on the announcement at the final stage. In equilibrium, citizens
choose eort, not only to best respond to the “implemented” tax rate from the
ex-post point of view, i.e., eJo;1(F
J
1; t
J
1) = e
C(J1), but also to maximise the amount
under the constraint that the ruler does not renege on his announcement, i.e.,
eJo;1(F
J
1; t
J
1) = e¯(F
J
1; t
J
1).
Furthermore, lemma 4.2 shows that equilibrium JI is
FJ1 = (1   tJ1)eC(tJ1)=: (4.6)
Then, the equilibrium JI and announced tax are as follows:
fFJ1; tJ1g = argmaxF;t te
C(t)   F subject to F = (1   t)eC(t)=:
The constraint shows that JI, F, and announced tax, t, have a negative relation.
If the ruler tries to make the low tax rate credible, he needs to create a high
level of JI, since he has a large incentive to renege on the announced tax rate.
From the first order condition of the above maximisation problem, equilib-
rium tax rate tJ1 becomes
13
tJ1 =
1
2
 
1 +

 + 
!
: (4.7)
The following proposition summarises the equilibrium strategies and de-
notes the comparative statics.
Proposition 4.1. (i) The equilibrium strategies of this game are given by equations
(4.1) (or (4.2)), (4.4), (4.6) and (4.7).
13The closed-form solution of FJ1 is F
J
1 = [1   =( + )]2=8.
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Figure 4.1: The Laer curve and the cost of JI
(ii) tJ1 is decreasing with  and increasing with . Furthermore, t
J
1 is strictly higher
than tC that is a tax rate maximising taxation without the commitment problem.
(iii) FJ1 is decreasing with  and .
The equilibrium tax rate is always higher than the rate maximising taxation
with full commitment; that is, the equilibrium tax is on the inecient side of the
Laer curve. To explain the result intuitively, consider a small decrease in the
announced tax rate from the equilibrium rate and an increase in the level of JI
that satisfies equation (4.6). Such a change has two eects on the ruler’s payo.
One is an increase in taxation and the other is an increase in the cost to create
the self-enforcing independent judiciary. The second eect shows the potential
ineciency of credible commitment. Since a decrease in the announced tax
rate, if committed to, induces an increase in private production and, then,
induces a greater potential for additional taxation, it strongly tempts the ruler
to abolish the independent judiciary. Thus, the ruler needs to pay the cost of
an increase in JI for credible commitment. Figure 4.1 shows the relationship
between taxation and the cost of the self-enforcing independent judiciary with
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respect to the tax rate.
Both a low unit cost for the ruler to create JI, i.e., low , and a high unit cost
for the ruler to subvert the judiciary, i.e., high , improve his ability to commit
to the low tax rate. Under low , the ruler can aord to create a high level
of JI. Furthermore, remember that the ruler can credibly commit to a tax rate
low enough to satisfy the condition that additional taxation from reneging on
the announcement equals the cost of subordinating JI. Hence, the ruler facing
high  can credibly commit to the low tax rate. In section 4.4, I will discuss an
interpretation of these comparative statistics.
Establishment of an independent judiciary becomes a Pareto improvement
compared to the case of lack of commitment. Remember that, in the case
without JI, the ruler cannot collect any taxes since citizens anticipate the ruler’s
abuse of power and then do not produce. Although creating JI is costly to the
ruler, equilibrium JI enables him to collect taxes greater than the cost. Citizens
also enjoy JI. Since the ruler protects their property rights, citizens benefit from
producing consumption goods.
4.2.3 Equilibrium in exogenous information transmission
Now, I analyse the general model with two stochastic states: one with perfect
information on JI, denoted by state o, and the other without information, de-
noted by state u. Assume p 2 [0; 1]. I use the same notation to outline the
perfect Bayesian equilibrium as in subsection 4.2.2.
At first, since the ruler’s payo at the final stage is irrelevant to citizens’
information structure, the ruler imposes the tax rate based on equations (4.1)
and (4.2); that is, Jp(F; t; e) = 
J
1(F; t; e) and r
J
p(F; t; e) = r
J
1(F; t; e) for any p. Then,
at state o, citizens also choose the amount of eort as in equation (4.3); that is,
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eJo;p(F; t) = e
J
o;1(F; t) for any p.
At state u, citizens anticipate the level of JI, based on the announced tax
rate. Let( f jt) = Pr(F  f jt) be a probability distribution function representing
their belief conditional on the announced tax rate. Then, citizens under state u
maximise their expected utility based on their belief;
eu(t;) = argmax
e
Z
f
[1   rJp( f ; t; eJu;p)](1   t)ed( f jt)   e2:
Next, consider the ruler’s strategy about announced tax and JI. When citi-
zens know the level of JI, the ruler cannot obtain additional gain by reneging on
the announced tax rate. However, when citizens do not have information on JI,
the ruler may realise a strictly positive gain by reneging on the announcement.
The expected payo of the ruler using behavioural strategy r is
Rˆ(F; t; rJp; eJo;p; eu)
= p
n
[1   rJ1(F; t; eJo;1(F; t))]teJo;1(F; t) + rJ1(F; t; eJo;1(F; t))(eJo;1(F; t)   F)
o
+(1 p)
n
[1   rJ1(F; t; eu(t;))]teu(t;) + rJ1(F; t; eu(t;))(eu(t;)   F)
o
 F:
Let t() and F() be the policy thatmaximises the ruler’s expected payo given
citizens’ belief function.
Now, I define PBE of this game. Citizens under u choose as eJu;p(t) = eu(t;
J
p)
based on their belief Jp, and the ruler sets the level of JI as F
J
p = F(
J
p) and
announces the tax rate as tJp = t(
J
p). Belief function 
J
p is consistent with the
ruler’s strategy if the information set is on the equilibrium path, i.e, given
announcement tJp, 
J
p( f jtJp) equals 0 for any f < FJp and equals 1 for any f  FJp.
If the announced tax does not equal tJp, I assume the specific belief function
such that Jp( f jt) = 0 for any f  0. This belief on the out-of-equilibrium
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path suciently restricts the ruler’s discretion. If the out-of-equilibrium tax
rate is announced, whatever the level is, citizens under state u believe that the
ruler will renege on the announcement. Although this restriction of the out-of-
equilibrium belief is slightly strong, it makes the following analysis simple.14
On the equilibrium path, citizens correctly anticipate the level of JI even
if they do not have information on it. This means that, on the equilibrium
path, subordination of the judiciary is not strictly profitable to the ruler. The
following proposition presents the PBE most favourable to the ruler among all
PBE and shows the comparative statics.15
Proposition 4.2. (i) In the PBE that maximises the ruler’s expected payo, citizens
under state u choose eJu;p(t
J
p) equal to eC(t
J
p) if the announced tax rate is t
J
p and equal to
0 if otherwise. The ruler chooses (FJp; t
J
p) equal to (F
J
1; t
J
1) if p  1=2 and equal to (F˜; t˜)
if otherwise, where t˜ = [(1   p) + ]=( + ), and F˜ = (1   t˜)eC(t˜)=.
(ii) For any p < 1=2, tJp is higher than t
J
1, and decreasing with p. As in Proposition
4.1, tJp is decreasing with , increasing with , and strictly higher than C.
(iii) For any p < 1=2, FJp is lower than F
J
1, and increasing with p. As in Proposition
4.1, FJp is decreasing with  and .
Points of proof for PBE strategies are as follows. At first, since, on the
equilibrium path, even citizens under state u exactly expect the level of JI the
ruler sets, the ruler obtains a payo by at most the amount he can collect in
the special case p = 1, which is R(FJ1; tJ1; tJ1; eC(tJ1); eC(tJ1)). Suppose that, in the
14Equilibrium policy (FJp; t
J
p) is unchanged by other reasonable out-of-equilibrium beliefs
such as, (i) for any t < tJp, ( f jt) = 1 for any f  0, and (ii) for any t > tJp, ( f jt) = 0 for any
f 2 [0;FJp) and ( f jt) = 1 for any f  FJp.
15The full range of PBE is characterised as the following. First, on the equilibrium path,
citizens choose the same level of eort under any states as that in the perfectly observed
case, which is eJo;1(F
J
p; t
J
p). Equilibrium JI and announced tax need to satisfy the following
two inequalities: tJp  t˜ and tJpeJo;1(FJp; tJp)   FJp  0. The first inequality is about the credible
commitment and the second is non-negative payo condition.
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PBE, the ruler chooses (FJ1; t
J
1). Then, citizens choose e
C(tJ1) for any state on the
equilibrium path. The ruler’s payo is R(FJ1; tJ1; tJ1; eC(tJ1); eC(tJ1)). However, if the
probability of state u, that is 1 p, is suciently high, the ruler may have a gain
by decreasing the level of JI from FJ1 to renege on the announcement. Note that
he cannot change the announced tax rate because of citizens’ o-equilibrium
beliefs. Consider the ruler’s deviation to F = 0.16 Then, since citizens under
state o do not produce, the ruler receives payo R(0; tJ1; 1; 0; eC(tJ1)). Hence, the
condition of (FJ1; t
J
1) being implementable in PBE is R(FJ1; tJ1; tJ1; eC(tJ1); eC(tJ1)) 
R(0; tJ1; 1; 0; eC(tJ1)), which equals condition p  1=2.
Equilibrium policy (FJp; t
J
p) is intuitive. Value t˜ shows the lowest tax rate to
which the ruler can credibly commit in PBE. If the probability that citizens have
perfect information on JI, i.e., p, is suciently high, the ruler can implement
the same policy as in the case of perfect information, i.e., tJp = t
J
1  t˜. In this
case, the deviation to a lower level of JI to renege on the announced tax is not
profitable to the ruler. At state o, which is likely to be realised, citizens find the
deviation, and then they lower production. Thus, the ruler loses tax revenue
from them. The benefit from deceiving citizens at state u does not cover the
cost. Suppose, instead, that p is low enough to satisfy p < 1=2. Then, the ruler’s
best choice is to commit to as low a tax as possible, i.e., tJp = t˜. Notice that the
equilibrium tax rate is still on the inecient side of the Laer curve.
Probability of information transmission, p, is crucial to credibility of commit-
ment. When p is smaller than 1=2, an increase in p contributes to commitment
to the lower tax rate. Suppose an extreme case where citizens never obtain
information on JI, i.e., p = 0. Then, the ruler does not have any incentive to
create an independent judiciary, so, in equilibrium, FJ0 = 0. Thus, since the ruler
cannot commit to a tax rate strictly lower than 1, the citizens does not produce
16Actually, F = 0 is the optimal deviation to the ruler. See proof in Appendix.
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at all. The next section argues that, even in this miserable situation, the ruler
can commit to JI by guaranteeing human rights if the cost of human rights is
low.
4.3 Human rights as a signal
This section analyses the case inwhich citizens cannot observe JI, i.e., p = 0. It is
the worst scenario for both the ruler and citizens, since citizens cannot produce
consumption goods at all because they anticipate a lack of commitment, and
then the ruler cannot collect taxes.
Farber (2002) argues that, to inform citizens of the level of JI, the ruler
can provides them human rights. Even though human rights protection is
irrelevant to production eciency and costly to the ruler, it can be a credible
signal of the ruler’s enthusiasm for committing to JI. This is because under
a high level of JI, the ruler can protect those rights at low cost. By building
on Farber’s work, this section creates a model to discuss a mechanism behind
how human rights protection becomes a signal of JI and how it aects the
equilibrium level of the credible tax rate and JI.
Themodel is changed as follows. After the ruler sets JI, he provides the level
of human rights, G 2 [0;1), to citizens. Human rights include, for example,
freedom from torture, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and so on. I
assume that if the ruler creates a level of JI higher than F¯, then the cost of
introducing human rights G is G where  < 1, while if strictly less than F¯, the
cost is G. Protecting human rights is costly for the ruler since the absence of
torture and the presence of freedom of speech allow his political opponents the
right to challenge his political position. The independent judiciary helps the
ruler to protect human rights because it can enforce the protection as a veto
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player.17 I also assume that the level of human rights does not aect production
eciency and citizens’ utility. In the following discussion, I omit subscript u
for simple expression.
The ruler’s payo is now
R(F;G; t; ; e) = e   It,F   F   IFF¯G   (1   IFF¯)G;
where IFF¯ is an indicator function equal to 1 if F  F¯ and equal to 0 if otherwise.
Let fFH;GH; tH; H; (rH); eHg denote a set of PBE strategies. As in the last
section, I focus on the PBE in which the ruler’s expected payo is maximised.
At the last stage, the ruler chooses the tax rate still based on equations (4.1)
and (4.2), irrespective of the value of human rights, i.e., H(F;G; t; e) = J1(F; t; e)
and rH(F;G; t; e) = rJ1(F; t; e) for any G.
Citizens’ beliefs regarding the level of JI is now conditional on the two
variables the ruler sets, announced tax rate t and human rights G. I use same
notation to denote the belief, that is,( f jt;G) = Pr(F  f jt;G). Hence, except
their belief function, citizens’ payomaximisation problem is the same as what
citizens under state u face in subsection 4.2.3. Let e(G; t;) denote the solution
of the payomaximisation problem given belief .
Again, let Rˆ denote the ruler’s payo under a behavioural strategy, r. Given
citizens’ response e(G; t;), the ruler’s choice of JI, human rights, and an-
nounced tax are
fF();G(); t()g = argmax
F;G;t
Rˆ(F;G; t; rH; e(G; t;)):
The equilibrium needs to specify the out-of-equilibrium belief. As in the
17The literature argues that JI positively contributes to the protection of human rights (Keith,
2002; Keith et al., 2009).
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last section, I simplify it such that for any out-of-equilibrium announcement
t , tH and/or human rights G , GH, the belief function is ( f jG; t) = 1 for
any f  0.18 Then, the PBE is characterised such that citizens make eorts
eH(G; t) = e(G; t;H) and the ruler establishes JI FH = F(H), provides human
rights GH = G(H), and announces tax tH = t(H). The equilibrium belief H
is calculated based on the Bayes rule on the equilibrium path and is denoted
above o the equilibrium path.
The following proposition characterises the PBE with the ruler’s highest
payo among all PBE payos and shows comparative statistics.19
Proposition 4.3. Let tInt = (1 + )=2 and tCor = 1   (2F¯)1=2. Also, let FBou =
(1   tInt)eC(tInt)=, FInt = (tInt   )eC(tInt)=, FCor = (tCor   )eC(tCor)= and G˜(t) =
[(1   t)eC(t) + F¯]=(1   ).
(i) Suppose that FBou  F¯  FInt. Then, in the PBE in which the ruler’s expected
payo is maximised, his choice of JI, human rights, and announced tax is such that
FH = F¯, GH = G˜(tInt) and tH = tInt. Announced tax is higher than tC, is also higher
than tJ1 if and only if  is higher than =(+), is increasing with  and is independent
from F¯,  and . Human rights protection is increasing with  and F¯.
(ii) Suppose that F¯  minfFBou; FCorg. Then, the ruler chooses FH = F¯, GH = G˜(tCor)
18Although this simple belief function, of course, allows unreasonable equilibria, the focus
on the ruler’s most preferred PBE excludes them. The equilibrium survives forward induction
refinements, although the refinements the literature uses are not directly applicable in this
game. Cho and Kreps (1987), for example, invent a refinement for signaling games with
“hidden knowledge,” while this game is on “hidden actions.” A forward induction criterion
based on the same motivation of Cho and Kreps (1987) is as follows. Suppose that FH  F¯ and
eH(GH; tH)  e¯(FH; tH). If signalGH satisfies the condition thatGH > [FH+(1 tH)eH(FH; tH)]=(1 
), it must hold that for any G 2 [[FH + (1   tH)eH(FH; tH)]=(1   );GH], the belief function is
( f jG; tH) = 0 for any f 2 [0;FH) and( f jG; tH) = 1 for any f  F¯. This refinement implies that
the ruler needs a minimum amount of human rights to show that he founds JI with level of FH.
19I characterise the full range of PBE actions without proof. Equilibrium JI is either F¯
or 0. Positive JI F¯ can be an equilibrium if strategies satisfy the following: eH(GH; tH) =
minfeC(tH); e¯(F¯; tH)g, [tHeH(GH; tH) G]=  F¯ andGH  [(1 tH)eH(GH; tH)+F¯]=(1 ). The first
condition shows the citizens’ equilibrium eort. The second shows the ruler’s non-negative
payo condition, and the third shows the credible signaling. Furthermore, there always exists
PBE such that FH = 0. In this case, equilibrium action is that GH equals 0, tH can be anything,
and eH(GH; tH) equals 0.
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and tH = tCor. Announced tax is higher than tC, is also higher than tJ1 if and only if
F¯ is smaller than FJ1, is decreasing with ,  and F¯, and is independent from  and .
Human rights are increasing with , ,  and F¯.
(iii) Suppose otherwise. Then, the ruler chooses FH = 0, GH = 0 and tH is anything.
(iv) Citizens choose eorts eH(G; t) = eC(t) if G = GH > 0 and t = tH, and
eH(G; t) = 0 if otherwise.
Implications of this proposition and intuitive explanation of the proof are
as follows. At first, if the equilibrium level of JI is strictly positive, then it is
F¯. Suppose that, in equilibrium, FH is strictly positive but less than F¯. In this
case, the ruler does not gain the benefits from reducing the cost of providing
human rights G, and so the signal is not credible. Thus, the ruler prefers to
set F = 0 rather than FH and renege on the announcement, which leads to a
contradiction. Suppose, instead, that FH is strictly greater than F¯. Then, the
ruler can increase his payo by reducing JI to F¯ since citizens do not observe
this reduction and so do not change production. Furthermore, the reduction
of F does not aect the cost of protecting human rights GH, while it reduces the
cost of creating JI.
Then, suppose that the ruler establishes independent judiciary F¯ and an-
nounces tax tH. Now consider human rights protectionGH. If the ruler commits
to the announcement, then he receives payo
R(F¯;GH; tH; tH; eH) = tHeH(GH; tH)   F¯   GH:
If the ruler founds no JI to renege on the announcement and to impose tax rate
1 finally, he receives
R(0;GH; tH; 1; eH) = eH(GH; tH)   GH:
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For credible signaling, R(F¯;GH; tH; tH; eH) must be higher than R(0;GH; tH; 1; eH),
which can be rewritten as
GH  [(1   tH)eH(GH; tH) + F¯]=(1   ):
The inequality provides the minimum value of credible signaling.
Given the minimum value of signaling, tax rate tInt denotes the interior so-
lution satisfying eC(tInt) < e¯(F¯; tInt), and tCor denotes the corner solution.20 Even
if human rights satisfy the above condition and taxes maximise the payo, the
ruler does not establish JI unless the payo is non-negative, i.e., the ruler estab-
lishes JI F¯ if for the interior solution,R(F¯; G˜(tInt); tInt; tInt; eC(tInt))  0which equals
the case F¯  FInt, and for the corner solution, R(F¯; G˜(tCor); tCor; tCor; eC(tCor))  0
which equals the case F¯  FCor.
In PBE, the equilibrium level of JI can be ineciently high. If F¯ satisfies
FBou  F¯  FInt, the ruler creates JI to gain the cost reduction of providing
human rights. The equilibrium announcement in this case is tInt, which is
higher than tCor. Thus, if citizens observe the level of JI, i.e., if p = 1, the ruler
can commit to lower tax tCor, instead of higher tax tInt. In other words, under
perfect information transmission, announcement tInt becomes credible under a
lower level of JI than F¯. This high F¯ is inecient because the ruler does not
completely take advantage of the independent judiciary to lower the tax rate.
In the casewhere the level of F¯ is low, i.e., F¯ < minfFBou;FCorg, if the ruler tries
to implement the low tax rate, he needs to increase the level of JI the same as
in section 4.2. Although the ruler actually wants to increase JI so as to commit
to the lower tax, signaling for JI higher than F¯ is not credible. Then the ruler
faces boundary constraint, eC(tCor) = e¯(F¯; tCor), and announces the tax rate, tCor.
20Notice that in PBE with the ruler’s highest payo, lemma 4.2 does not always hold,
although eC(tH)  e¯(F¯; tH) still holds.
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The equilibrium tax rate, tH, is again located on the inecient side of the
Laer curve. The reason is similar to the one in section 4.2. Suppose that the
ruler sets a lower rate that brings the same tax revenue as the equilibrium tax
rate does. Since, with this tax rate, production is higher, the ruler has more
incentive to renege on the announcement. Then, the ruler needs to protect a
higher degree of human rights, which leads to a higher cost, while, in section
4.2, the ruler must set a higher level of JI.
The marginal eect of F¯ on the credible tax rate is not continuous. At low
values of F¯, amarginal increase contributes to lowering the tax since JI increases.
However, if the level of F¯ is high enough to satisfy F¯ > FInt (or FCor < F¯ < FBou),
the ruler cannot commit to an announced tax less than 1. Since JI F¯ is needed
to make the announcement credible, implementation cost is too high to reward
the ruler who established JI F¯.
An increase of  prevents the ruler from committing to the low tax rate if
FBou  F¯  FInt. In this case, the cost of human rights protection becomes large
compared to tax revenues. If the value of  is near to tInt or tCor, a high level
of human rights protection is needed for credible signaling. Then, providing
signaling becomes too costly to make the announcement credible, and so the
ruler is reluctant to create an independent judiciary in equilibrium.
Posner (1998) argues that, for poor countries without institutional environ-
ments for enforcing legal rights, it is costly to establish well-functioning legal
systems. Posner (1998) then proposes that the state should, at first, create a
rule that involves small fixed and marginal costs. His argument would corre-
spond to the case of high  and/or high F¯ in this model. In this case, the profits
from creating a high level of JI does not outweigh the cost. Furthermore, he
argues that formal judicial systems can be substituted by informal institutions.
Remember that the last section shows that education and media diusion are
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eective for credible commitment. Thus, given the high cost of credible signal-
ing, the most ecient way to enforce rights would be to use them, rather than
relying on protecting human rights.
4.4 Discussion
This section briefly discusses theoretical implications derived from this model
and their empirical validity. At first, I intuitively discuss relationships between
choice variables of players, e.g., economic development, JI, property rights pro-
tection and human rights protection. Since these variables are simultaneously
determined in the model, pay attention to identification of empirical models.
Then, I discuss what causes a variation of these endogenous variables.
As already confirmed in the literature, a credible commitment to property
rights protection, denoted by low , causes economic development, denoted
by high e, which is shown by the equilibrium eort function eJp = eC(). The
empirical literature finds that property rights protection has a positive eect on
GDP per capita (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2005; Rodrik et al., 2004). Furthermore,
since the equilibrium tax rate is always located on the inecient side of the
Laer curve, property rights protection leads to high tax revenue.
Although the theoretical literature emphasises reputation equilibrium for
credible commitment, this chapter unravels a mechanism of institutional solu-
tion to the commitment problem. Equation (4.6) shows that, in equilibrium,
the ruler needs a high level of JI so as to commit to a low tax rate credibly, i.e.,
there exists a positive relationship between JI and property rights protection.
This finding is supported by numerous anecdotes, for instance, 17th-century
England after the Glorious Revolution (North and Weingast, 1989) and the
Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt established in 1979 (Moustafa, 2007).
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Furthermore, La Porta et al. (2004) empirically show that both indices of JI
and constitutional review positively correlate with an index of property rights
protection.
By combining the above two arguments, the model shows that a high level
of JI leads to economic development through credible commitment to prop-
erty rights protection. Contrary to this prediction, Glaeser et al. (2004) find no
correlation between an index of JI and the GDP growth rate. In fact, various
evidences show that, even though courts are granted “formal” JI, a fear of sub-
version of judicial systems by the ruler prevents courts from carrying out their
mission based on the rule of law (Ramseyer and Rasmusen, 2003; Ginsburg,
2003). To tackle with this problem, Feld and Voigt (2003) distinguish between
de jure JI and de facto JI and show that although de jure JI does not aect the
GDP growth rate, de facto JI positively correlates with it. The degree of de
facto JI in their paper is considered as the level of credible JI in this chapter.
Whereas the model provides a consistent positive connection between JI,
property rights protection and economic development, the eect of human
rights protection on those variables are not straightforward. The role of human
rights in this chapter is a signal of JI. Thus, only in an economy where citizens
cannot evaluate JI, i.e., probability p is suciently low, human rights protection
is relevant to property rights protection and economic development. An em-
pirical prediction of this study is that human rights protection and economic
development have a nonlinear relationship, which is influenced by degree of
free media diusion or education attainment, which represent p. Blume and
Voigt (2007) show positive linear correlation between human rights protection
and the investment ratio, while they do not find a linear correlation of human
rights protectionwithGDPgrowth and total factor productivity. Furtherworks
analysing the nonlinear relationship are necessary to conclude the empirical
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evaluation of human rights protection.
Now, I will discuss what develops the ruler’s incentive to establish JI and
protect property rights. The model shows that a state with high democratic
values, represented by low , can establish a highly independent judiciary i.e.,
the existing institutions enforce the complementary institutions. This result
explains a reason that democratic regimes (and also competitive authoritarian
regimes) have judicial systems independent from the executive and legislative
branches more often than autocratic regimes (Levitsky andWay, 2002; Helmke
and Rosenbluth, 2009). The model predicts that, through a channel of JI,
democratic values also contribute to property rights protection and economic
development.21
The ruler can successfully protect property rights under high , which is
interpreted such that the ruler faces a high risk of losing legitimacy either do-
mestically or internationally if he ignores the judicial decisions; for example,
England after the Glorious Revolution and small states dependent on interna-
tional trade (North and Weingast, 1989; Silverstein, 2008). While high  leads
to property rights protection and economic development, the eect of  on the
level of JI is ambiguous. A state with high  needs a lower level of JI to commit
to a given tax rate than a state with low  needs to commit to the rate. Thus,
although the rulers facing high  can commit to a low tax rates, they do not
need to found a high level of JI. For example, although, in the UK, the judiciary
has not been authorised to conduct constitutional review, the legislature can
credibly commit to various policies.
Proposition 4.2 shows that probability of information transmission, denoted
by p, contributes to commitment to an eective judicial system and property
21The empirical literature does not achieve consensus about the relationship between democ-
racy andeconomicgrowth. Democracywouldhave several channels to aect economicgrowth.
See Barro (1996); Tavares and Wacziarg (2001).
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rights protection, and economic development. Remember that probability p
is interpreted as the degree of free media diusion or education attainment in
the country. Djankov et al. (2003) empirically show that state ownership of the
media positively correlate with autocracy. Then, consistent with the results
of this model, they also show that the share of government ownership of
the press negatively correlates with property rights protection. Furthermore,
Brunetti and Weder (2003) also empirically show that a free press helps to
reduce government’s corruption.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has analysed an independent judiciary as a commitment device
in a game of political commitment between a ruler and citizens. The model
shows that, as long as citizens observe JI with some positive probability, the
ruler creates an independent judiciary and protects property rights credibly.
Furthermore, even if the probability equals zero, by protecting human rights,
which function as a signal of credible JI, the ruler can credibly commit to
property rights protection.
Although equilibriumwith apositive level of JI brings Pareto improvements
to both the ruler and citizens, two types of ineciency arise. The first source of
ineciency is that the equilibrium tax rate is on the inecient side of the Laer
curve. Suppose that the ruler announces a low tax rate and citizens produce
the large amount of goods. Then, because he can collect large additional taxes
from reneging on the announcement, the ruler has a large incentive to renege
on the announcement, which implies the high cost of credible commitment.
Second, the protection of human rights needs an unnecessarily high level of JI,
in which case the ruler does not eectively use JI for lowering the tax rate.
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This model has two insuciencies. First, for simplicity, I assume that the
judiciary always acts to keep the announced tax rate, and so I exclude the
judiciary as a player from the model. In general, however, the judiciary has
policy preferences that can dier from the ruler’s and citizens’ preferences.
Hence, the model should explicitly add the judiciary as a player, which would
be consistent with the literature on third-party delegation. Second, although
this model shows the creation of an independent judiciary, it does not show its
evolution. Generally, it takes significant time to make the judiciary eective,
and the evolution is not monotonic. Therefore, the model should be extended
to amulti-period gamewith adjustment costs of improving the judicial system.
4.6 Appendix: Proofs
The Proof of Lemma 4.1
Atfirst, consider themaximisation problemof equation (4.3) given a fixed value
of r. Let eo;1(r) denote a solution of this problem. From the first-order condition,
eo;1(r) = (1  r)(1  t)=2. Notice that eo;1(r) decreases with r. Furthermore, eo;1(1)
equals 0.
From the properties of eo;1(r) stated above and equation (4.2), a system of
equations (4.2) and (4.3) has a unique solution of equations (4.4) and (4.5).
The Proof of Lemma 4.2
Assume that, in equilibrium, eC(tJ1) < e¯(F
J
1; t
J
1). Then, the ruler can increase
his payo by lowering F, since it does not aect citizens’ decision of eort.
However, this fact contradicts the assumption that FJ1 is an equilibrium level of
JI.
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Alternatively, assume that eC(tJ1) > e¯(F
J
1; t
J
1). The ruler’s maximised payo
is R = [tJ1=(1   tJ1)   ]FJ1, and policy (FJ1; tJ1) meets the constraint FJ1 < (1  
tJ1)e
C(tJ1)=. In this case, the ruler’s maximised payo must be zero. Suppose
that it is positive. Then, the ruler can increase his payo by increasing F, which
contradicts the assumption that FJ1 is an equilibrium level of JI. Now consider
tax rate t0 = 1   , where  is positive and suciently small. Furthermore,
let F0 be the level of JI such that (F0; t0) meets the constraint that 0 < F0 <
(1   t0)eC(t0)=. Under these values, the ruler’s payo is strictly positive, i.e.,
R0 = [t0=(1   t0)   ]F0 > 0. Hence, the assumption that eC(tJ1) > e¯(FJ1; tJ1)
contradicts.
The Proof of Proposition 4.1
(ii) Notice that tJ1 = [1 + =( + )]=2 > 1=2 = t
C. Furthermore, @tJ1=@ < 0 and
@tJ1=@ > 0.
(iii) Notice that @FJ1=@ < 0 and @F
J
1=@ < 0.
The Proof of Proposition 4.2
At first, note that since, in the PBE, citizens under state u have perfect knowl-
edge about the equilibrium level of JI, the ruler’s payo is at most the amount
in the special case where p = 1.
Then, I characterise the conditions that the ruler can set policy (FJ1; t
J
1). Sup-
pose that the ruler chooses (FJ1; t
J
1). Under this policy, citizens choose eort as
eJo;1(F
J
1; t
J
1) = e
C(tJ1), irrespective of the information structure. In this case, the
ruler’s expected payo is
R(FJ1; tJ1; tJ1; eC(tJ1); eC(tJ1)) = tJ1eC(tJ1)   (1   tJ1)eC(tJ1)=:
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Now, consider the deviation from equilibrium JI FJ1, i.e., the case where the
ruler tries to renege on the announced tax rate. Notice that the ruler still needs
to announce tax rate tJ1 due to citizens’ o-equilibrium action. Since he resets
the tax rate equal to 1, the ruler establishes no JI. Then, citizens under state o
does not produce at all. The ruler’s expected payo in this case is
R(0; tJ1; 1; 0; eC(tJ1)) = (1   p)eC(tJ1):
The relationship between the two payos is
R(FJ1; tJ1; tJ1; eC(tJ1); eC(tJ1)) R R(0; tJ1; 1; 0; eC(tJ1)) if and only if tJ1 R
(1   p) + 
 + 
= t˜:
Therefore, only if tJ1  t˜, policy (FJ1; tJ1) is in equilibrium. The condition can
be rewritten as p  1=2. Furthermore, I can straightforwardly prove that, if
condition p  1=2 holds, the ruler’s optimal action is (FJ1; tJ1).
Next, suppose that 0 < p < 1=2. In this case, the ruler cannot credibly
implement policy (FJ1; t
J
1) in equilibrium. Since, on the equilibriumpath, citizens
under state u also anticipate the exact level of F, the ruler cannot receive strictly
positive gains from reneging on the announcement. From this property on
the equilibrium path, the equilibrium that maximises the ruler’s payo is the
solution of the following maximisation problem:
max
F;t
teJo;1(F; t)   F s.t. t  t˜:
In the solution, eJo;1(F; t) = e
C(t) = e¯(F; t) holds because of a similar proof to
lemma 4.2. Hence, the solution is t = t˜ and F = F˜.
Finally, suppose that p = 0. Then, the next lemma holds.
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Lemma 4.3. Suppose that p = 0. There is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium such that
the ruler sets the strictly positive level of JI and commits to the announced tax strictly
lower than 1.
Proof. Suppose that, in equilibrium, the ruler creates the positive level of JI,
FJ0 > 0. However, the ruler can receive a positive gain from lowering the level
of JI since citizens does not change their production. 
From the lemma, the ruler sets FJ0 = 0 and announces any tax rate in equi-
librium. A potential announcement is 1, which equals limp!0 t˜. Furthermore,
notice that limp!0 F˜ = 0.
The Proof of Proposition 4.3
I prove this proposition with four steps. In the first three steps, under the
assumption that the equilibrium level of JI is strictly positive, I characterise
the equilibrium actions of the ruler. Then, in the final step, I analyse the
non-negative payo conditions about the ruler’s payo.
Step 1: Note that since, on the equilibrium path, citizens can expect the
exact level of JI, the ruler does not receive strictly positive gains by reneging
on the announcement. Using this fact, I prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4. If the equilibrium level of JI is strictly positive, it is always F¯.
Proof. Suppose that there is an equilibrium level of JI FH 2 (0; F¯). Then, the
equilibrium announced tax rate is strictly less than 1. On the equilibrium path,
citizens choose eort as eH(GH; tH) = eJo;1(F
H; tH) > 0. Then, the ruler’s payo
is tHeH(GH; tH)   FH   GH. However, the ruler has incentive to set F = 0 since
eH(GH; tH) GH > tHeH(GH; tH) FH  GH. Hence, the assumption of FH 2 (0; F¯)
leads to a contradiction.
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Next, suppose that equilibrium FH is in (F¯;1). Then, the following inequal-
ity holds;
tHeH(GH; tH) FH GH  eH(GH; tH) (+)F¯ GH > eH(GH; tH) (+)FH GH:
The first inequality means that the ruler does not receive positive gains by
establishing lower JI and reneging on the announcement, and the second in-
equality comes from the assumption that FH > F¯. Therefore, strict inequality
(1   tH)eH(GH; tH) < FH holds, and, from equation (4.3), eH(GH; tH) < e¯(FH; tH).
Then, consider the level of JI F0 = FH   , where  is positive and suciently
small. With F0, the ruler increases his payo without violating the constraints
for credible commitment. Hence, it contradicts the assumption. 
Step 2: Consider the credible signal. To make the signal credible, the level
of GH must satisfy the following inequality;
R(F¯;GH; tH; tH; eH) = tHeH(GH; tH) F¯ GH  R(0;GH; tH; 1; eH) = eH(GH; tH) GH:
With citizens’ beliefs that maximise the ruler’s equilibrium payos, the level of
signal is
G(tH) =
1
1   
h
(1   tH)eH(GH; tH) + F¯
i
:
Step 3: Announced tax rate t is the solution of the following payomaximi-
sation problem;
max
t
teJo;1(F¯; t)   F¯  

1   
h
(1   t)eJo;1(F¯; t) + F¯
i
:
The formulation implies that the ruler provides the human rights, the level of
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which shows the credible signal for JI, and that citizens know the level of JI on
the equilibrium path. Then, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 4.5. In PBE such that the ruler’s payo is maximised and FH = F¯, the
equilibrium eort level satisfies that eH(GH; tH) = eC(tH)  e¯(F¯; tH).
Proof. Suppose that e¯(F¯; tH) < eC(tH). In this case, citizens choose eH(G(tH); tH) =
e¯(F¯; tH). The ruler’s equilibrium payo is, then,
R(F¯;G(tH); tH; tH; e¯(F¯; tH)) =
"
(tH   )
1   tH   
#
F¯
1   :
In PBE, the above payomust be non-negative.
Now consider the announcement t0 = tH +  where  is positive and su-
ciently small so that it satisfies e¯(F¯; t0) < eC(t0). The following ruler’s strategies
and citizens’ actions can be supported by another PBE: JI is F¯, announcement
is t0, human rights is G(t0), and eort on the equilibrium path is e¯(F¯; t0). This is
because
R(F¯;G(t0); t0; t0; e¯(F¯; t0)) =
"
(t0   )
1   t0   
#
F¯
1    > R(F¯;G(t
H); tH; tH; e¯(F¯; tH))  0:
However, the first strict inequality shows contradiction with the assumption
that tH is a PBE announcement that maximises the ruler’s payo. 
Then, the candidate of the equilibrium tax is argmaxtf(t )eC(t) s.t. eC(t) 
e¯(F¯; t)g. The interior solution of this problem denoted by tInt is (1 + )=2. The
interior solution of this problem is the solution if F¯  (1   tInt)eC(tInt)= = FBou.
Suppose that F¯ < FBou. Then, the solution is the corner tCor such that eC(tCor) =
e¯(F¯; tCor), i.e., tCor = 1   (2F¯)1=2. Notice that tCor decreases with ,  and F¯.
Furthermore, tCor is higher than tC, since, in this case, tCor > tInt > tC.
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Step 4: Consider the ruler’s payo. If the ruler’s payo is negative, the
ruler’s equilibrium action is FH = 0 and GH = 0. Suppose that F¯  FBou. Then,
the interior solution is in equilibrium if R(F¯;G(tInt); tInt; tInt; eC(tInt))  0, which
can be rewritten as F¯  (tInt   )eC(tInt)= = FInt. Suppose, instead, that F¯ < FBou.
Then, the corner solution is in equilibrium if R(F¯;G(tCor); tCor; tCor; eC(tCor))  0,
which equals F¯  (tCor   )eC(tCor)= = FCor.
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